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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the dynamic impact of a changing external 
environment on strategic responses of a company and aims to provide a 
framework for managers in Hong Kong based companies to assess their 
corporate strategies in the context of changing environment so as to maintain 
good performance. 
We investigated the competitive moves of a well performed airline, 
Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, from 1989 to 1995 in respond to the 
environmental variations. These competitive moves are compared with a 
proposed "Environmental Changes-Strategic Responses" profile. 
Results indicate that CPA has responded in a similar manner as 
expected. However, due to the special characteristics of the aviation industry 
and the rationale of the company, CPA had made different responses or taken 
different sequence of moves in some occasions. Based on the analysis, a 
revised "Environmental Changes-Strategic Responses" profile is established. 
Since the external environmental changes encountered by CPA are common 
to other Hong Kong based companies, this profile can be considered by their 
managers when they formulate strategic responses to the environmental 
changes. 
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A central principle of strategic management is that organizations must 
maintain a proper alignment with their environments. While organizations 
are dependent on their environments for resources (Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), organizations can manage this dependency by developing 
and maintaining strategies CThompson, 1967； Hofer and Schendel, 1978). 
Therefore, as environments change, so should organizations' strategies 
O"hompson, 1967). As much of the traditional contingency literature 
suggests, environment, on one hand, can and should influence strategy (Dess 
and Beard, 1984; Miller and Friesen, 1984) while, on the other hand, the 
business strategies of an organization can directly influence external 
environments in its favor through changing competitive condition (Porter, 
1980, 1985). 
Although many researchers have examined the different strategies 
organizations can use to cope with their various environments (Hambrick, 
1983; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Mintzberg, 1973; Porter, 1980), most of 
their studies have been accomplished in static environmental settings. As 
Smith and Grimm (1987: 363) pointed out, "Very little is known about the 
dynamic relationship between environmental variation and strategic change." 
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As external environments of organizations become more and more 
dynamic with rapid changes in various aspects, such as advancement of 
technology and availability of information, understanding the environment-
strategy relationship is critical to a firm's performance or even its survival. 
This is especially true for those Hong Kong based companies which 
cannot or have great difficulties to move their businesses out of the territory, 
such as those in the telecommunications, aviation, power, banking or real 
estate development, etc. Their commercial and operational environments 
have experienced great uncertainty and drastic changes — induced by the 
handover of the sovereignty of Hong Kong from the British government to the 
People's Republic of China in 1997 and the increasing intensity of 
competition. 
This study examines the dynamic impact of a changing external 
environment' on a firm's strategic response^. It would provide a framework 
for managers, especially in the Hong Kong based companies, to assess their 
corporate strategies in the context of the changing external environment so as 
to maintain good performance and efficiency. It also aims to provide a 
"Environmental Changes-Strategic Responses" list that can be considered by 
‘The external environment includes the industry environment defined by 
industry opportunities and threats as well as the broader societal environment 
reflected by government policy and political factors, etc. (Porter, 1980). 
2 A response is a definite and noticeable counteraction — or competitive 
moves as defined by Porter (1980) — taken by a firm with regard to one or more 
competitors to defend or improve its relative competitive position. 
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these managers and executives when they develop strategies for their 
corporations during this specific period of time. 
This study employs a case-basis approach which allows an in depth 
analysis of the issue from a dynamic perspective. Cathay Pacific Airways 
Limited ("CPA"), the Hong Kong's flagship international passenger and freight 
carrier, was selected as the object of the study. 
CPA is a particular good site for exploring this topic because of the 
recent drastic changes in her operational environment — the Hong Kong 
aviation industry. Moreover, CPA had been proven a successful airline for 
years. A consistently high performance illustrates that CPA must maintain an 
appropriate fit between the environment and strategies^ 
The dynamics of the environmental variations and the airline's 
corresponding strategic responses from 1989 to 1996 are studied. Data about 
the environmental changes of the Hong Kong aviation industry and the 
strategic responses of CPA in this period have been collected from two main 
sources: (1) the reports and articles in the trade journals and newspapers, and 
(2) the annual reports of the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department and the 
company. 
The collected data of dynamic changes in CPA's external environments 
and her corresponding strategic responses are analyzed. The 21 types of 
competitive moves identified by Levine (1987) in his comprehensive review 
^ Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. was ranked second in 1996 with Singapore 
Airlines being number one and Japan Airlines Ltd. holding the third position (IATA, 
1997). 
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of airline competition since deregulation are used as a basis for formulating 
the examination dimensions. These actions, with respect to the Porter's 
(1980) five-force f ramework、are further grouped into the external 
environmental changes — which includes four areas, namely (1)legal / 
political environment, (2) rivalry intensity, (3) industry growth, and 
(4) internal factors — and the organizational course of actions — which 
consists of nine categories, specifically (1) new promotion, (2) new services / 
service improvement, (3) daily departure increase / decrease, (4) route exit / 
entry, (5) frequent flyer program, (6) acquisition of new planes, 
(7) corporation / alliance with other airlines, (8) intra-industry merger and 
acquisition, and (9) organizational structure changes. The environment and 
the CPA's response profile, in the form of two matrices, are constructed 
accordingly and analyzed to list the possible industry and environmental 
changes and the corresponding strategic moves of CPA. The response lag is 
also recorded. 
Finally, the results of the analysis were compared with the matrix 
developed from the literature review to generate an "Environmental Changes-
Strategic Responses" list which is applicable in the typical environment of 
Hong Kong. 
4 According to Porter (1980), there are five forces that determine an industry 
profitability, hence the attractiveness of the industry, because they influence prices, 
costs, and required investment of firms in an industry. These five forces are namely 
entry of new competitors, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers, 
bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry of the existing competitors. 
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The next chapter discusses the related literatures on the relationship of 
strategy and external and industry environment, fol lowing by the background 
of the target company in our study, CPA, and the aviation industry. Chapter 4 
gives a detailed description of the methodology of our study. Chapter 5 lists 
the results of our qualitative and quantitative analyses on CPA's external 
environment, her strategic responses and operational performance. The final 




External and lndustrv Environments 
External environment could be the external limits determined by its 
industry and broader environment. Industry opportunities and threats define 
the competitive environment. Societal expectations reflect the impact on the 
company of such things as government regulation, social concerns, evolving 
mores, and many others. 
Government regulation was widely studied in the past. It includes 
legislation passed by legislative bodies as well as rules issued by 
administrative agencies. Mahon and Murray (1980; 1981) offer a framework 
for evaluating regulation as an environmental force affecting firm's actions 
and performance levels from a strategic management perspective. They 
identified two types of regulation: social regulation and economic regulation. 
Social regulation aims to regulate non-economic activities across industry. 
Economic regulation is typically directed at specific industry. 
Besides government regulation, industry attractiveness and competitive 
position are the two well known environmental factors that underlie the 
choice of competitive strategy. Porter (1985) argued that competitive strategy 
not only responds to environment but also can shape the environment in a 
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f irm's favor. There are five forces that determine the attractiveness of an 
industry. They are namely entry of new competitors, threat of substitutes, 
bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry of 
the existing competitors. These five forces determine the industry profitabil i ty 
because they influence prices, costs, and required investment of firms in an 
industry. Exhibit 1 highlights all the elements of industry structure that may 
drive competit ion in an industry. The main points highlighted by Porter 
(1980) are discussed in the foIlowings: 
• Entry of new competitors. New entrants to an industry bring new 
capacity and hence the pressure for the lowering of the prices. This 
reduces the profitability of the existing firms. However, the threat 
of an entry into an industry depends on the barriers to entry that are 
present, coupled wi th the reaction from the existing competitors 
that the entrant can expect. There are six major sources of barriers 
to entry. They are economies of scale, product differentiation, 
capital requirements, switching cost, access to distribution channels, 
and government policy. The major relevant source of entry barriers 
relevant to this study is the government policy. Government can 
l imit or even foreclose entry into industries wi th such controls as 
licensing requirements and limits on access to distribution channel. 
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EXHIBIT 1. Porter's Five-Force Framework and Elements ofthe Industry.^ 
Forces Driving Industry Competition 
Entry Barriers P o t e n t i a l 
Rivalry Determinants En t ran tS 
Threat of new 
entrants 
^ r 
Bargaining l n d u s t r y Determinantsof 
powerof Competitors ^uyerPower 
suppliers i • 
Suppliers • V J ^ Buyers 
V_y Bargaining 
Determinants of g v # A m o n g 口 二 






Entry Barriers Determinants of Supplier Power 
Economics of Scale Absolute cost advantages Differentiation of inputs Cost relative to total 
Proprietary product Proprietary learning Switching costs of purchases in the 
differences curve suppliers and firms in industry 
Brand identity Access to necessary the industry Impact of inputs on cost 
Switching costs inputs Presence of substitute or differentiation 
Capital requirements Proprietary low-cost inputs Threat of forward 
Access to distribution product design Supplier concentration integration relative to 
Government policy Importance of volume to threat of backward 
Expected retaliation supplier integration by firms in 
the industry 
Rivalry Determinants 
lndustrygrowth Concentrationand DetenninantsofBuyerPower 
Fixed (or storage) costs / balance Bargaining Leverage Price Sensitivity 
value added Informational complexity Buyer concentration vs Price / total purchases 
intermittent overcapacity Diversityofcompetitors firm concentration Product differences 
Product differences Corporate stakes Buyervolume Brand identity 
^Tl ident i〜 ‘ Exit barriers Buyer switching costs Impact on quality I 
Switching costs relative to firm performance 
switching costs Buyer profits 
Determinants of Substitution Threat Buyer information Decision makers' 
r ^ : Ability to backward incentives 
Relative price performance of substitutes integrate 
Switching costs Substitute products 
Buyer Propensity to substitute Pull-through 
‘Porter, Michael E. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining 
Superior Performance (1985): 6. 
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• Threat of substitutes. Al l firms are competing, in a broad sense, 
wi th industries producing substitute products. Substitute products 
that deserve the most attention are those that are subject to trends 
and are produced by industries earning high profits. 
• Bargaining power of buyers. The power of the buyer's group 
depends on a number of characteristics of its market situation and 
on the relative importance of its purchases from the industry 
compared wi th its overall business. 
• Bargaining power of suppliers. Suppliers can exert bargaining 
power over participants in an industry by threatening to raise prices 
or reduce the quality of purchased goods and services. 
• Rivalry of the existing competitors. Rivalry occurs because one or 
more competitors either feels the pressure or see the opportunity to 
improve position. In most industries, competit ive moves by one 
firm have noticeable effects on its competitors and thus induce 
retaliation or efforts to counter the move. The rivalry can take the 
form of price competit ion, advertising battles, product 
introductions, and increased customer services or warranty. Slow 
industry growth is one of the major factor that turns competi t ion 
into a market share game for firms seeking expansion. 
This five-force framework allows a f irm to identity those strategic issues 
that wou ld mostly improve the firm's profitabil ity. However, in any particular 
industry, not all of the five forces are equally important and the particular 
structural factors that are important w i l l differ. Every industry is unique and 
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has its unique structure. The framework does not eliminate the need for 
creativity in finding new ways of competing in an industry. 
Strategic Actions and Response 
Smith, Grimm, Gannon and Chen (1991), fol lowing Egelhoff (1982), 
used information processing as a theoretical concept to help explain 
relationships between the type of competitors' actions and response 
characteristics. Competitive actions and the information they convey can take 
many forms, but one important distinction among them is whether they are 
strategic or tactical (Egelhoff, 1982; Porter, 1980; Smith and Grimm, 1987). 
Strategic actions involve significant commitments of specific, distinctive 
resources and are difficult to implement and reverse. A major change in the 
definition of a business is an example (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986). 
Tactical actions, on the other hand, are often designed to fine-tune strategy； 
they involve fewer and more general resources than strategic actions, are 
easier to implement and are more often reversible. 
Levine (1987) identified 21 types of competitive moves in his 
comprehensive review of airline competition since deregulation of US airline 
industry. Miller and Chen (1994) further stated that an action, in the airline 
industry, was defined as strategic if it involved significant investments in fixed 
assets, people or structure. In some cases, strategic actions represent a major 
departure from industry norms. Seven kinds of actions were deemed to be 
strategic: mergers and acquisitions, hub creations, feeder and inter-industry 
alliance, new services, frequent flyer programs and new airplane purchases. 
11 
These actions involve relatively long time horizons, considerable financial 
expenditures and represent important and relatively irreversible departures 
from the status quo. 
Schumpter (1934, 1950) viewed a market as a mechanism that lets 
firms experiment by taking specific actions either in an attempt to lead or to 
fol low. Firms are successful in carrying out leadership actions, or reaping 
profits because they occupy a monopolistic until they are imitated (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). The excess of profits of the acting firms and the losses 
and lost opportunities experienced by the non-responders motivate the latter 
to respond and imitate the actions. Smith et al. (1991) stated that an action or 
event could be defined as a detectable competitive move. A response, 
however, could be defined as a clear cut counteraction taken by a firm to 
specific competitors' actions to defend or improve its position (Porter, 1980). 
Schumpter (1934, 1950) also emphasized the importance of profits in 
motivating a firm to act or respond. In theory, an acting firm could earn 
abnormal profits through the monopolistic position (first mover advantage) it 
has prior to a response. 
Smith et al. (1991) identified four attributes of competitive response, 
namely as imitation, likelihood, lag and order. He argued that rivals wi l l 
respond to the first mover if they generate above normal profits. It is 
expected that as the profits derived from an action increase, so wi l l the speed 
and number of responders who wi l l attempt to mimic or duplicate it. Thus, 
firms want to take action against competitors who are unlikely to respond, 
who have a low response likelihood, or who respond slowly (demonstrating a 
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high respond lag). A third important dimension of action and response is 
response order. Response lag and response order capture different 
dimensions of response. The final characteristic is the type of response that is 
made. 
These four attributes shape the characteristics of a firm. A firm can be 
considered aggressive competitor when it is non-initiative, likely, fast and first 
responder. Non-aggressive competitor is the imitative, unlikely, slow and late 
responder. An aggressive response can lead to advantage for a responding 
firm by building up an entry barrier. Failure to quickly block a competitor's 
action can be expensive for the responding firm. In addition, an aggressive 
response can help shaping the environment favorable to the responding firm. 
Smith et al. (1991) showed that there is a positive relationship of both 
early and late response to a rival with profitability. The important attribute is 
the speed that control the response order. They alsostated that, "Responding 
fast and early may be an inefficient use of resources if the key is responding 
ahead of rivals. Similarly, responding fast but late may serve no useful 
economic purpose. It may be that the longer a firm can delay a response but 
yet respond ahead of rivals, the more time it has to develop an effective 
response." (1991 ： 79) Concerning the response likelihood, it was marginally 
related to performance. Response likelihood was unrelated to it. 
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External Environment and 
Strategic Responses 
As much of the traditional contingency literature suggests, 
environment can and should influence strategy (Miller and Friesen, 1984). It 
is argued that the matching of strategy and environment can influence 
performance — a poor match can hurt performance. Traditional contingency 
theorists further argued that strategies were the necessary responses to 
environments more than influencers of environments (Child, 1972). They 
have treated performance as a function of the match between organization 
and environment, with no consideration of strategy. Other researchers (Miller 
and Friesen, 1986) argued that strategy can contribute to good performance if 
it suits a firm's environment. Porter (1980) further argued that strategies wi l l 
have a profound influence on organizational structure through the coordinate, 
technical and control task they entail. 
Although not in the same context of airline industry, Smith and Gr imm 
n986) argued that government influence and regulation in rail industry is a 
very important environmental conditions. Firms did not change their 
strategies in accordance to the environmental changes would result in poor 
performance. Mahon and Murray (1981) also pointed out that the transition 
from a protected environment to a competitive environment is a dramatic 
change in a firm's organization. 
When dealing with the strategies selection in a changing industry and 
environmental structure, Porter (1985) claimed that there are five basic 
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approaches. The approaches can sometimes be employed sequentially or in 
combination. 
• Bet on the most probable scenario. The firm designs its strategy 
around the scenario that is seen to be most probable, accepting the 
risk that it may not occur. 
• Bet on the "best" scenario. The firm designs its strategy for the 
scenario in which the firm can establish the most sustainable long-
run competit ive advantage given its initial position and resources. 
• Hedge. The firm chooses a strategy that produces satisfactory 
results under all scenarios, or at least under all scenarios that are 
deemed to have an appreciable probabil ity of occurring. Usually, 
hedging wi l l yield a strategy that is not optimal for any scenario. 
• Preserve flexibility. The f irm chooses a strategy that preserves 
f lexibi l i ty until it becomes more apparent which scenario w i l l 
actually occur. 
• Influence, A firm attempts to use its resources to bring about a 
scenario that it considers desirable. It requires a firm to influence 
the causal factors behind the scenario variables. 
Wi th the identification of an appropriate strategy, a firm can adopt 
three generic strategies identified by Porter (1985): differentiation, cost 
leadership and focus. Porter argued that by creating customer loyalty and 
price inelasticity, this differentiation strategy erects competit ive barriers to 
entry. Differentiation via product innovation often involves new 
technologies, wh ich is generally more prevalent and useful in dynamic 
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environments. Market differentiation via advertising, prestige pricing, and 
market segmentation can create a unique image for a product. The strategy of 
cost leadership requires firms to become the lowest cost producers in an 
industry. Much effort is devoted to cost control so that above-average returns 
can be obtained even with low prices. Porter's final generic type, the strategy 
of focus, caters to a circumscribed and specialized segment of a market, such 
as a limited geographical area. 
Miller (1988), however, further revealed that the matching of 
environment and strategy is probably not enough to ensure good 
performance. A strategy must also be suited to the structure needed to 
implement it. The study also challenges the views of Porter (1980) that 
different strategies can be used to compete quite successfully in the same 
industrial environment (Miller and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980; Lenz, 1981). If 
environment is taken to be the whole industry of which a firm is a member, 
the assertion may be true. But, if environment means specific target niches, 
with given levels of dynamism and unpredictability, the statement is 
questionable. The findings indicated that there are indeed significant and 
performance-related associations between strategy and a target environment. 
Finally, the study indicated that strategy, structure and environment should be 
closely aligned for better performance. 
Summary 
When assessing the impact of external environment on strategic 
response, most recent researches tried to evaluate the impact in terms of 
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operational performance (Schefczyk, 1993), and speed of responses (Smith et, 
1988). The environmental changes include not only those outlined by 
Porter's (1980) model, but also other external factors such as social or 
economic factors. Government regulation is a major factor that was 
examined. 
However, little was done, in particular the airline business, on the 
dynamic impact of the environmental factors on the responses. Levine's 
(1987) list is a useful list of competitive moves in the airline industry and can 
be used as a basis when examining the dynamic nature of the airline industry. 
So, according to the nature of the competitive moves in the airline industry, 
we could classify the list into five categories from Type I to Type V {Exhibit 2): 
Type I are promotion and image related; Type II are service related; Type III 
are the price related; Type IV are organization structure related; and Type IV 
are the expansion related issues. 
In summary, we expect that the changes in the external environment 
would induce some types of responses. Exhibit 3 are the types of responses 
expected. 
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ExHiBiT2. Mapping ofLevine's Competitive Moves 
with Porter's Generic Strategies. 
Response Type Levine's Competitive Moves 
Type I New Promotion 
Promotion with non-airlines 
Special fare advertisement 
Type II Service Improvement 
New Service 
Commission rate change for agent 
Ticket purchase requirement 
Acquisition of new plane 
Daily departure increase 
Daily departure decrease 
Type lli Price increase 
Price cut 
Entry price cut 
Fare structure 
Type IV Operations Streamlining^ 
Type V Route exit 
Route entry 
Frequent Flyer program 
Hub creation 
Feeder Alliance 
Corporation with other airline 
Intra-industry merger and acquisition 
2 This is a competitive move identified by Porter (1985) related to cost 
leadership. 
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ExHiBiT 3. Environmental Changes-Strategic Responses Profile 
Types of Responses^ 
Environmental Factor I II /// |V V 
Legal / Political Environment^ P S 
Intensity of Rivalry^ P S2 Si 
Industry Growth^ S P 
Internal Factor Cost^ P S 
3 "P〃: Primary response； "Sn〃:门出 secondary / subsequent response. 
4 "Legal / Political Environment" corresponds to Porter's "Entry of New 
Competitors". 
5 "Intensity of Rivalry" and "Industry Growth" correspond to Porter's "Rivalry 
Amount to Existing Competitors". 




CATHAY PACIFIC AlRWAYS 
AND AVIATION INDUSTRY 
Corporate Background 
Cathay Pacific Airways Limited ("CPA〃）is Hong Kong's flagship 
international passenger and freight carrier, serving 45 destinations in 25 
countries. As at March 1997, CPA's fleet size was 59 aircraft, comprising 38 
Boeing 747s (32 passenger aircraft, 6 freighters), four Boeing 777s, six Airbus 
A340s and 11 Airbus A330s. The airline has also three Boeing 747 freighters 
leased to Air Hong Kong ("AHK"), an all cargo carrier based in Hong Kong. 
CPA is publicly listed with her controlling shareholder — Swire Pacific 
Ltd. — holding 43.86 percent and Beijing-backed companies holding 33.34 
percent - led by CITIC Pacific Ltd. with 25 percent, China Travel Service 
(Holdings) Hong Kong Ltd. ("CTS") and China National Aviation Corporation 
("CNAC') each owning 4.17 percent {Exhibit 4), 
CPA's interests extend to Hong Kong's only other locally-based airline 
operators with 17.8 percent stakes in Hong Kong Dragon Airlines Limited 
("Dragonair"), an intra-regional passenger airline which mainly serves China, 
and 75 percent stakes in AHK. Additionally, CPA engages in aircraft 
maintenance services _ with an investment of 25 percent stakes in Hong 
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Kong Aircraft Engineering Co. Ltd. — and inflight catering — owning 75 
percent stakes in Cathay Pacific Catering Services (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
In 1995, the airline was ranked second among the Asia-Pacific airlines 
in terms of international passenger traffic' and fourth in terms of international 
passenger load factor? 
ExHiBiT 4. Corporate Structure of Cathay Pacific Airways Limited. 
CITIC 25% 
Pacific — 25% ^ 17.8% — Dragonair 
(Passenger) 
「一 一 7 . 7 % 一 —— 一 — — — — — — 
_ J 
CNAC — 4 . 1 7 % — r L _ - 2 7 . 6 % J 
L _ _ | I HAECO 
j 一25% 一 (Aircraft 
“““！ j ^ . . Maintenance) 
oSwire ―灯嶋――Cathay — 
Pacific Pacific 
一 750^  — Air Hong Kong 
CTS — 4 . 1 7 % — (Cargo) 
Free Cathay Pacific 
Float —22-8% ~ ~ ~ 75%——Catering Services 
L _ _ _ J (Hong Kong) 
‘ T h e ranking of Asia-Pacific airlines in 1995 in terms of international 
passenger load factor is: (1) Dragonair, (2) Singapore Airlines, (3) Qantas Airways, 
(4) Cathay Pacific Airways, (5) Air Lanka, (6) Air New Zealand and (7) Japan Airiines' 
(IATA, 1997) 
2 The ranking of Asia-Pacific airlines in 1995 in terms of international 
passenger traffic is: (1) Singapore Airlines, (2) Cathay Pacific Airways, (3) Japan 
Airlines,⑷ Thai Airways, (5) Malaysian Airlines, (6) Korean Airlines and'(7) Qantas 
Airways. (IATA, 1997) 
2 / 
The Global Aviation Industry 
The aviation industry worldwide has suffered declining yields and load 
factors through the early 1990s as a result of recession in the major developed 
economies, the 1990/91 Gulf crisis and excess capacity from aggressive fleet 
expansion programmes of various airlines begun in the late 1980s. These 
factors combined to decimate the record profits made towards the end of the 
previous decade. The performance of airline operations worldwide in 1995 
indicate a slow emergence from the industry's worst known slump, helped by 
the economic recovery in North America and Europe and, perhaps more 
importantly, aggressive cost-cutting. Among the leading 25 airlines (ranked 
by sales)/ 17 airlines made an operating profit in 1994, compared with just 12 
in 1982. 
Compared with their North American and European rivals, Asian 
airlines have operated in a more favorable environment in the last several 
difficult years for the industry, contributed by more robust economic growth 
in the Asia-Pacific region. This is reflected in the traffic growth figures, 
according to Boeing, which show that traffic to, from and within the region 
(excluding domestic travel) grew at 7.5 percent per year or 1.6 times the 
International average through the early 1990s. Even in 1991, when the Gulf 
war caused a 4.4 percent decline in international traffic, international traffic 
related to the Asia-Pacific region bucked the trend with a 3.3 percent 
increase. But, despite this comparative advantage, Asian airlines have not 
been immune from the effects of increased competitive pressures and over-
capacity. Consequently, they too have suffered from declining yields, load 
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factors and profitability since the end of the 1980s, particularly on their 
international scheduled passenger operations. 
Supported by the economic recovery in the U.S. and Europe, 
international air traffic grew 5.5 percent in 1994. The Asia-Pacific region 
continued to outperform in 1995 with related international traffic expanded 7 
percent. Travel growth to, from and within the Asia-Pacific region, which 
comprises the fastest growing economies of the world, should continue to 
outpace other parts of the world, underpinned by several trends including 
rising income and the rapid increase in tourism. The downside for Asian 
carriers is the increased competition they are expected to face as the region 
attracts additional capacity. 
According to the Asia Pacific Air Transport forecast (1980-2010) 
published by the International Air Transport Association ("IATA") Oanuary 
1997), the total intentional scheduled passenger traffic to, from and wi th in 
Asia Pacific grew by 10.2 percent per annum on average between 1985 and 
1995, whereas international scheduled passenger for the rest of the wor ld 
grew by only 3.8 percent per annum on average during the same period. The 
global share of Asia-Pacific international scheduled passenger traffic increased 
from 26.2 percent in 1985 to 35.2 percent in 1995. 
The Honq Konq Aviation Industry 
As in other countries, the Hong Kong Government at present controls 
the routes of the airlines in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government has 
adopted a "one route, one airline policy". It claims that if along a certain 
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route one airline already offers adequate service, two airlines would create 
excess capacity so that neither could make a profit and, as a result, the 
consumer would suffer from deterioration of service. 
After r ' J u l y 1997, the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region provide for Hong Kong to 
have a high degree of autonomy in aviation matters and "for the maintenance 
of the status of Hong Kong as a center for international and regional aviation". 
This endowed power includes the authority to negotiate bilateral air transport 
agreements^ with other countries. 
There are three locally-based airline companies in Hong Kong, namely 
Cathay Pacific Airways Limited ("CPA"), Hong Kong Dragon Airlines Limited 
("Dragonair") and Air Hong Kong Limited ("AHK"). Dragonair is a Hong 
Kong-based intra-regional passenger airline operating scheduled and charter 
services throughout Asia, mainly China and AHK is a Hong Kong registered 
all-cargo carrier with scheduled services to Europe, the Middle East, Japan the 
USA. Among these three companies, CPA has been the dominating airline 
which also owns certain amount of stakes in the other two. In 1995, the 
China National Aviation Corporation (Hong Kong) Limited ("CNAC"), a 
3 Bilateral air transport agreements deal with many matters, but the essential 
regulatory issues are covered by the clauses which deal with five basic issues: 
(1) specification of routes which may be operated by the airlines of the two 
contracting coutnries; (2) designation, i.e. licensing, of the airlines by the 
contracting countries to operate the routes specified in the bilateral; (3) ownership 
and control of the designated airlines by nationals of the state concerned； 
(4) capacity regulation for the airlines of each country to operate on the routes 
agreed； and (5) tariff regulation of fares and rates on routes between the two 
countries subject to the approval of the two governments concerned (World Tourism 
Organization, 1994). 
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subsidiary of China's aviation regulatory body, applied for a Airl ine Operation 
Certificate ("AOC") to operate from the territory and approval was granted by 
the Hong Kong Civil Aviation Department in 1996. However, up the 
moment when this study report is published, CNAC has not yet started their 
operation. 
In 1995, the total international scheduled passenger traffic to and from 
Hong Kong was more than 27.3 mil l ion passengers, almost three times the 
passenger volume — 9.3 mill ion — in 1985 (Table 2), equivalent to an annual 
growth rate of 11.3 percent in this ten-year period. Among the different 
regions in the world, the travel to and from points in the Asia-Pacific has 
dominated Hong Kong's international traffic — 84 percent of the total 
international scheduled passenger traffic as in 1995 — and wi l l continue to 
grow in the next decade (Table 2). Northeast and Southeast Asia has been 
and wi l l be the major composition of traffic to and from Hong Kong (Table 3). 
Hong Kong, as a major hub in Asia, has long been facing a congestion 
problem with her international airport, Kai Tak. In 1995 there were 60 
international airlines providing about 2,700 scheduled passenger and all 
cargo flights each week and approximately 230 non-scheduled passenger and 
cargo charter flights each week between Hong Kong and over 100 
destinations worldwide. Being one of the busiest airports in the world, Kai 
Tak Airport has gone through several expansion in the last two decades, 
however, the surge in air traffic volume has rendered these expansions 
inadequate, with the vast majority of air traffic being the passenger flights. 
Considering the anticipated growth in air traffic volume in the coming years, 
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the Hong Kong Government finally announced her plan for the Chek Lap Kok 
Airport to be opened at mid 1997 with a single runway and facilities able to 
meet the demands of 35 mil l ion passengers and three mil l ion tons of air cargo 
annually. A second runway and associated facilities are set to open by the 
end of 1998 and the capacity of the airport can then accommodate 87 mi l l ion 




In this project, Cathay Pacific Airways Limited ("CPA") is chosen as the 
target for studying the dynamic impact of external environment on a 
company's strategic response. This Hong Kong's flagship international 
passenger and freight carrier is a particular good site for exploring the 
relationship between the dynamic external environment and a firm's strategic 
responses toward such variations because of the recent drastic changes in her 
operational environment — the Hong Kong aviation industry— induced by 
the handover of sovereignty from the British government to the People's 
Republic of China to be taken place on ” ju ly 1997. Moreover, CPA has 
been mentioned to be an airline with outstanding performance which was 
reflected by her above-average load factor among Asian-Pacific airlines (Table 
12 in Appendix 3). This implies that her strategic responses have well fitted 
the environmental changes to obtain such performance results. 
In order to confirm her operational performance to be superior, we 
carried out a quantitative analysis which concentrates on operational 
performance or the cost efficiency aspect of the performance analysis. The 
resulting performance of CPA, during the studied period (1989-1995), is 
evaluated compared with those of the other Asia-Pacific airlines, namely 
Japan Airlines ("JAL"), Korean Airlines ("KE"), Singapore airlines ("SQ"), and 
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Thai Airways ("TG")'. We selected these airlines as reference based on three 
criteria, namely the size of the carrier, international operations and public 
availability of data. According to International Air Transport Association 
("IATA") World Air Transport Statistics January 1997, CPA, SQ and JAL are the 
top three Asian airlines for international passenger traffic in 1995^ CPA, SQ, 
TG and KE share the same attributes that international passenger traffic 
contributes to most of the airline's passenger kilometers and their domestic 
traffic is relatively small. JAL shares the similar attributes except that her 
domestic traffic contribute to about one fifth of the revenue passenger 
kilometers. 
P e r f o r m 3 n c G M e 3 s u r 6 m e n t 
Schefczyk (1993) suggested a model that fundamentally connects the 
services provided by an airline to the resources consumed in providing these 
services. This model relates the output and input of the airline operations. 
The inputs can broadly be classified into asset-related inputs and cost related 
inputs {Exhibit 4). Asset-related inputs are those inputs that represent capital 
goods and current assets. Cost-related inputs include labor, fuel and related 
‘The data are collected from the Advanced Air Traffic Report published by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") in 1996 and the annual 
reports of the years 1989-1995 of CPA, JAL and SQ. 
2 The net profit achieved in 1995 by CPA and SQ combined represented 60 
percent of the overall net profit achieved by Asia-Pacific airlines. Also, the ranking 
of Asia-Pacific airlines in 1995 in terms of international passenger traffic is: (1) 
Singapore Airlines, (2) Cathay Pacific Airways, (3) Japan Airl ines,⑷ Thai Airways, 
(5) Malaysian Airlines, (6) Korean Airlines and (7) Qantas Airways. (IATA, 1997) ‘ 
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ExHiBiT 5. Essential Inputs and Outputs of Airline Operations.^ 
I N P U T O U T P U T 
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items. The main output for a typical passenger focused airline is the revenue 
passenger kilometers. Further outputs are represented by cargo and other 
revenues. The link between inputs and outputs is the external demand for 
services which creates an internal demand for inputs. 
It was confirmed in Schefczyk's (1993) study that high operational 
performance is a key facet of high profitability. High passenger load factors 
and the growth potential also support high profitability of the airline. The 
study also revealed that the efficient passenger-focused airline tends to have 
3 Schefczyk, Michael. "Operational Performance of Airlines: An extension of 
Traditional Measurement Paradigms." Strategic Management Journal Vol 14 
(1993): 303. ‘ . 
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operating costs, excluding depreciation, amortization and aircraft rent, not 
exceeding 8 percent per passenger km. 
The common indicator of airline productivity is the passenger load 
factor which measure how many revenue passenger kilometers an airline can 
generate per available passenger kilometer. The difference in factor cost in 
different countries and the inclusion of the non-passenger factor may not be 
fully reflected in the calculation of load factor. This difficulty can be resolved 
by changing the basis from passenger kilometers to ton kilometers. It should 
also be noted that productivity alone cannot reflect overall airline 
performance. Productivity does not address the customer and competition 
issues well enough. 
Performance analysis is a process used to evaluate the cost efficiency, 
reliability, and timeliness of corporate management and design. The purpose 
of performance analysis is to identify areas of improvement in these activities 
as well as to aid strategic decision making. 
In order to confirm that CPA is a over-average performer, we 
employed the evaluation criteria suggested by Schefczyk. The fo l lowing 
variables' statistics are used to measure CPA and the other airlines' 
performance. These variables are classified into four categories, namely 
input, output, revenue related and other statistics. 
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1. Inputs 
• Available ton kilometer growth^ 
Available ton km = available ton km scheduled services 
+ available ton km charter services 
This figure reflects aircraft capacity obtained. 
• Non-flight asset growth< 
Non-flight assets = total assets — flight equipment (at cost) 
+ accumulated depreciation for flight equipment 
-purchase deposits for flight equipment 
-flight equipment under capital leases, at cost 
+ accumulated amortization for flight equipment 
under capital leases 
The figure reflects all assets not already reflected by available ton km. 
• Operating cost growth^ 
Operating cost = total operating expenses - aircraft rent 
—depreciation and amortization 
This figure reflects operating cost excluding capital and aircraft cost 
reflected in available ton km. 
2. Outputs 
• Revenue Passenger kilometer growth< 
Revenue passenger km = revenue passenger km scheduled services 
+ revenue passenger km charter services 
This figure reflects the passenger-flight related output. 
• Non-passenger revenue growth^ 
Non-passenger revenue = total operating revenue -passenger revenue 
This figure reflects all output that is not passenger-flight related. 
3. Airl ine Statistics (Revenue Related) 
• Return on equity 二 /Vicome after income taxes 
—common stockholders equity 
• Gross margin = income before income taxes + total operating revenue 
、The growth rates are calculated by 
Xi -Xo 
~ ~ ^ 0 ~ 
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• Passenger load factor = revenue passenger km (scheduled and charter) 
+ available passenger km (scheduled and 
charter) 
This figure represents aircraft utilization. 
• Percentage passenger revenue = passenger revenue 
+ total operating revenue 
This figure represents the passenger-focus ofan airline. 
• Revenue growth^ 
Compounded annual growth rate of total operating revenues 1989-
1995, adjusted for inflation. 
4. Air l ine Statistics (Others) 
• Revenue per revenue passenger km = passenger revenue 
(Passenger yield) + revenue passenger km 
High values indicate a high passenger revenue yield. 
• Revenue per available ton km = total operating revenue 
—available ton km 
High values indicate a high operating revenue yield. 
• Operating cost per available ton km = operating cost 
(Unit cost) +available ton km 
Low values indicate a high operation efficiency. 
• Available ton km per staff = available ton km + number of staff 
High values indicate a high staff efficiency. 
We have conducted two levels of statistical tests for the studied 
variables: A N O V A test; and t-test which is conducted only if the result of 
A N O V A suggests there is a difference between subjects/ 
5 The ANOVA test is conducted for each data set to assess whether there is 
any significant difference in the means and variances for the attributes of these three 
airlines during the studied period. The null hypothesis is Ho： jucpA = //sg =淋；a n d 
the alternate hypothesis is Hi: at least a pair of /s, are not equal. The rejection 
criteria is: If F' > F(cx, vi, vi) at a = 0.05, Ho is rejected, a = 0.05 is chosen for all 
statistics tests. The t-test is conducted for each pair of airlines' statistics. The null 
hypothesis is Ho： ficpA <jusQ and ficPA <陣.The alternate hypothesis is Hi: jucpA > 
//sQ and ficPA > jLi)Ai. The rejection criteria is: If t' > t(a, v) at a = 0.05, Ho is 
rejected, a = 0.05 is chosen for all the statisics tests. 
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Environmental Variations and 
Competitive Responses 
With the performance of CPA proved, the dynamics of the 
environmental variations — the aviation industry environment and the 
broader legal / political environment — and the airline's corresponding 
strategic responses from 1989 to 1996 are studied. 
Data about the environmental changes of the Hong Kong aviation 
industry and the strategic responses of CPA in this period are collected from 
two main sources: (1) the reports and articles in the trade journals and 
newspapers, and (2) the annual reports of the Hong Kong Civil Aviation 
Department and the company. 
For practical research purposes, it is impossible to examine each and 
every action taken at all levels within the organization. Competitive 
responses in the study refer only to implemented, public, market oriented 
decisions and significant, concrete actions taken by the airline company, that 
are observable by customers and competitors. Small scale actions, such as 
the price adjustment, are too unimportant and invisible to fall wi thin the 
scope of the study. 
To analyze the data collected, the 21 types of competitive moves 
identified by Levine (1987) in his comprehensive review of airline 
competition in the US since deregulation are used as a basis for formulating 
the examination dimensions (Exhibit 3). 
With respect to Porter's (1980) five-force framework, relevant to the 
study are further grouped into the external environmental changes — which 
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includes four areas, namely (1) legal / political environment, (2) rivalry 
intensity, (3) industry growth, and (4) internal factors — and the 
organizational course of actions — which consists of nine categories, 
specifically (1) new promotion, (2) new services / service improvement, 
(3) daily departure increase / decrease, (4) route exit / entry, (5) frequent flyer 
program, (6) acquisition of new planes, (7) corporation / alliance with other 
airlines, (8) intra-industry merger and acquisition, and (9) organizational 
structure changes. 
The external environment and the CPA's response profile, in the form 
of two matrices {Appendix 4 and 5), are constructed accordingly and analyzed 
to list the possible Industry and environmental variations and the 
corresponding strategic moves of CPA. The response lags are also recorded. 
These analysis results are then compared with the matrix developed 
from the literature review to generate an "Environmental Changes-Strategic 




Quantitative Analvsis : 
Operational Performance 
To confirm that CPA has achieved outstanding results with superior 
performance, her operational efficiency is compared with that of the other 
four airlines — JAL, KE, SQ and TG —using the 14 criteria' listed in the 
previous chapter. Data for this quantitative analysis are extracted from the 
financial and non-financial information provided in the Advanced Air Traffic 
Report published by the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICA〇〃）in 
1996 and the annual reports published by CPA, JAL and SQ for their fiscal 
years of 1989-1995' . 
‘ D u e to the availability of data, only three out of the 14 criteria, namely 
Available Ton Kilometer (ATK), Revenue Passenger Kilometer (RPK) and Passenger 
Load Factor, are compared using all the five airlines. The others are based on the 
data from CPA, JAL and SQ only. 
2 The fiscal years of CPA, SQ and JAL are different, which may cause a minor 
distortion to the analysis. The fiscal year of CPA ends at December of each year 
while those of SQ and JAL end at March. 
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In the analysis, the comparison of the variables' statistics are grouped 
into 4 aspects: inputs (Table 5), outputs (Table 7), revenue related statistics 
(Table 9), and other statistics (Table 11). 
The input measurements include available ton kilometers, operating 
costs and non-flight assets (Table 4). Both CPA and SQ have been expanding 
their fleets rapidly, with a compounded growth rate of higher than 10 percent 
dur ingthe studied period, almost doublingtheir capacity in these seven years. 
In contrast, JAL's fleet only grew in an annual rate of 5.5 percent. The 
investments of SQ and JAL in non-flight assets, on the other hand, were higher 
than CPA's whi le the growth of CPA's operating cost was the highest with that 
of JAL marginally lower and SQ's being the lowest. 
Regarding the output aspect (Table 6), CPA and SQ had a greater 
percentage growth in the revenue passenger kilometers than JAL whi le all the 
three airlines had similar growth rate in their non-passenger revenue. 
In summary, with the booming of the economies and the continual 
growth of travel in the Asia-Pacific region, the three airlines have expanded at 
a fast pace. 
On the revenue side (Table 8), the returns on equity for the three 
airlines have been in a declining drift. CPA gives the best return on equity 
whi le JAL has been in red since 1991. Similar to the return on equity, the 
gross margins are also dropping throughout the studied period. Nonetheless, 
SQ has outperformed CPA whi le JAL has been suffering from a negative 
margin. Due to the expansion in the capacity, the passenger load factors of 
CPA, SQ and JAL have all dropped but started to pick up in 1995. Whi le the 
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passenger focus of CPA and JAL has been decreasing and SQ has had not 
much change, CPA has had a higher average revenue growth than the other 
two airlines. 
Finally, the passenger yields of all the three airlines had a negative 
compounded growth rate in the studied period (Table 10). This is mainly due 
to the increasing intensity in competition. In average, CPA was the best and 
had a positive growth in her yield in 1995. SQ has been in a downward 
trend throughout the seven years and the situation is deteriorating whi le JAL 
has had a terrible year in 1995. Due to the rapid expansion in their capacity, 
both CPA and SQ have had a negative growth in their revenue per ATK with 
CPA in a better position. JAL has had an overall positive growth but the drop 
in 1995 was severe. On the other hand, SQ has done extremely well in their 
cost control with a compounded reduction of 4.3 percent in the unit cost. 
CPA also successfully controlled her costs. The airline has kept the unit cost 
constant. JAL, however, has had a compounded growth of 4.8 percent in her 
unit cost. Besides, the productivity of CPA's and SQ's staff has grown 50 
percent (as reflected by the ATKs per staff) during the studied period with that 
of SQ outperforming CPA's. 
In conclusion, as reflected from the analysis (Table 1), CPA has been 
performing well among the selected airlines. We therefore moved forward to 




SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL RESULTS ON 
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF 
CPA VERSUS JAL ANDSQ 
Available Ton Kilometer (ATK) Growth CPA > JAL CPA < SQ 
Non-flight Assets Growth CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Operating Cost Growth CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Revenue Passenger Kilometer (RPK) CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Growth 
Non-passenger Revenue Growth CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Return on Equity CPA > JAL CPA > SQ 
Gross Margin CPA>JAL CPA < SQ 
Passenger Load Factor CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Percentage Passenger Revenue CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Revenue Grow4h CPA = JAL CPA = SQ 
Revenue per RPK CPA > JAL CPA < SQ 
Revenue per ATK CPA<JAL CPA > SQ 
Operating Cost per ATK CPA < JAL CPA > SQ 
ATK per Staff N / A CPA < SQ 
Note: All the detailed statistics are listed in Appendix 3. 
* All relationships are significant at a = 0.05. 
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Qualitative Analysis : 
Environmental Variations and 
Strategic Responses 
Porter's five-force framework and other external environmental forces, 
such as social and economic factors, are used as a basis for classifying the 
events and hence identifying the associated responses. Three out of the five 
forces are used as the basis for examining CPA's reactions to the 
environmental changes. They are (1) entry of new competitors; (2) rivalry of 
the existing competitors; and (3) bargaining power of suppliers. 
Regarding the entry of new competitor, more emphasis was placed on 
the legal and political environmental changes. The rivalry of the existing 
competitor is observed by looking at the intensity of rivalry and the industry 
growth. The internal factor cost is the major element when examining CPA in 
the context of the bargaining power of suppliers. 
The t ime required for CPA to response to the events, whether it 
requires short or long lead t ime to respond, is observed. Performance of the 
airl ine dur ing the event-response cycle is also recorded to examine the effect 
and quality of the responses. 
Legal and Political Environment 
Three major events dur ing the period 1989-1997 were identif ied. 
They were: (1) in late 1989, Hong Kong government announced plan for the 
Chek Lap Kok Airport, to be opened at mid 1997; (2) in late 1994, Hong 
Kong Government announced the delay opening of the Chek Lap Kok 
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Airport; and (3) the change in the sovereignty from the British Government to 
the People's Republic of China in 1997. 
Event One : Plan for New Airport at 
Chek Lap Kok 
The Government's decision to build a replacement airport at Chek Lap 
Kok was a major external factor that shape the CPA's strategy during the 
1990s. This is a major release of the capacity constraint of the Kai Tak 
Airport. The airport gates and landing rights, after all, are the two crucial 
factors that determine the route expansion of an airline. The introduction of 
the new airport at 1997 enable the airline to plan her route expansion more 
aggressively. 
The study revealed that CPA responded almost immediately by 
introducing an aggressive fleet expansion and replacement plan starting from 
1990 (Table 4). The expanded opportunities expected to be provided by the 
opening of the new airport is the motivation for the fleet expansion. CPA 
responded by adopting the preemptive strategies as explained by Porter 
(1980), “ ... in which firm seeks to lock up a major portion of the market to 
discourage its competitors from expanding and to deter en t r y . 
It is observed that the average growth rate of the available ton 
kilometer is 11.2 percent. This is in contrast to the average growth rate of 
12.2 percent and 5.6 percent for SQ and JAL respectively. The result also 
suggested that the expansion plan for CPA is faster than JAL. This could be 
explained by the nearly saturation of the Narita airport and there was no 
major expansion of the airport during the studied period. The similar average 
growth rate of CPA and SQ suggested that there is route expansion capability 
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of Changi Airport. Therefore, SQ could be able to fol low the same expansion 
pace with CPA. 
With this pace of fleet expansion plan, there is evidence that the load 
factor of CPA is continuously decreased. However, similar trend was 
observed for SQ and JAL during the same period (Table 8). The resulting 
statistics revealed that the mean load factor for CPA, SQ and JAL do not have 
any significant difference (Table 9). This trend illustrated that the fleet 
expansion plan isn't the only factor contributed to the decreasing load factor. 
Event Two : Delay of New Airport 
Opening 
In late 1994, the Hong Kong Government announced that the opening 
of the Chek Lap Kok airport would be delayed to the first quarter of 1998. 
The Kai Tak airport is operating at a very congested situation. In the short 
term, the traffic constraints at Kai Tak wi l l limit capacity growth at CPA (and 
everyone else flying in and out of Hong Kong). 
CPA's reaction was to delay the delivery of the aircraft to 1996 and 
1997. This could help to maintain a reasonable load factor by not keeping 
the same pace of growth of the passenger and available tonne kilometer. The 
performance, however, was improved by the inability to increase the landing 
slots. As the passenger traffic is continuously increasing, the utilization of the 
aircraft is improved thereby improved the load factor. 
Event Three : Political Uncertainty of 
1997 
The political uncertainty associated with the airline is increasing as the 
handover of the sovereignty approaches. This involved the potential change 
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in the government policy. The way to defense the entry of potential rivalry is 
different. 
The earliest signal that the political factor become a major 
consideration by CPA when formulating its strategy was in 1990. This was 
exactly one year after the Tienanmen square event and seven years before the 
handover of the sovereignty in mid 1997. The first reaction was to build 
relationship with China. CPA acquired 30 percent stake in Hong Kong 
Dragon Airlines in order to build up relationship with CITIC. Two state run 
Chinese agencies, China National Aviation Corporation and China Travel 
Services (Holdings) Hong Kong Ltd. became shareholders in mid 1992. The 
sale illustrated CPA's plan to hedge against the possibility of being excluded 
from air routes after the change in sovereignty in mid 1997 by getting 
prominent mainland company as one of its shareholders. 
The second reaction was to restructure the company's organisation in 
1993. A position of deputy managing director was created in the Corporate 
Development who was responsible for the coordination and formulation of 
the company's China strategy. He also oversaw the development of the 
subsidiary and associated company such as Dragonair. A number of strategies 
were put into action, during the period 1993-1996, after this corporate 
restructuring. More Chinese executives were appointed to the director level. 
The Asian airline image was created by redesigning everything from the 
airline's logo to its ticketing counter and airport lounges. More weight was 
allotted to the Chinese language advertising. Part of the operation was moved 
to Guangzhou to build up relationship with the mainland. CPA intended to 
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form different types of joint venture and alliance with the Chinese partners 
since 1993. 
Rivalry Intensity 
There are three major events during the studied period. They are (1) 
the set up of the Dragonair in the mid 1980's; (2) the introduction of the 
Virgin Atlantic in the London route in February 1994; (3) the introduction of 
the AHK in the cargo route; and (4) the application of the Airl ine Operation 
Certificate by China National Aviation Corporation in the early 1995. 
Event One : Hong Kong Dragon 
Airlines ("Dragonair") 
The emerging of the Dragonair, as a Hong Kong based airline, at the 
mid 80's was a big threat to the CPA. At that t ime, Dragonair was a direct 
competitor to CPA. Dragonair's repeated applications to Hong Kong 
authority for right to fly to destinations served by CPA were consistently 
thwarted by CPA's lobbying clout. Wi th the persistence of the Government's 
pol icy on one-airIine-to-one-route policy, it was hardly for Dragonair to w in 
any battle for the route licenses and airport landing slots. CPA's strategy was 
to put Dragonair into red and then took over by acquiring a major stake in 
1990. After the takeover, the route of Dragonair was re-organized that it 
wou ld only fly to China and the secondary cities of South East Asia. 
Event Two : Virgin Atlantic Airways 
In February 1994, the Virgin Atlantic Airways started the fl ight 
operation for the London route. This action broke the duopoly of British 
Airways and CPA and pushed down the fare. CPA's defensive tactics is to try 
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to raise the structural barriers by influencing the Government / authorities 
policy that raise barriers. This was apparent when Virgin Atlantic Airways 
applied the landing slots in Hong Kong after her announcement of a regular 
flight in London route in end 1993. CPA was using her influence in the Civil 
Aviation Department in the landing slot allocation. The landing slots 
allocated for Virgin Atlantic Airways was between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. The 
allotted take-off slots would mean arriving in London at 3 a.m. However, the 
entry barriers creation was not successful. 
However, on the services provision level, CPA's response was to act as 
follower rather than leader. It took about one and a half year's time for CPA 
to respond to the prestige in-flight service offered by Virgin Atlantic initially in 
1994. In 1995, CPA announced a number of inflight service upgrade would 
be launched in 1995-1996. This included the offering of every passenger a 
personal television monitor with videos, games and interactive information 
programs. This was in contrast to what Virgin Atlantic launched in early 
1994. 
Event Three ； Air Hong Kong 
In 1994, CPA used the similar strategies to absorb a rival by buying a 
75 percent stake in freighter carrier Air Hong Kong. This planned purchase 
also prevented Guangzhou-based China Southern Airlines from buying into 
Air Hong Kong. The then Air Hong Kong's cargo services to Europe and Asia 
are merged and reshuffled with those of CPA. 
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Event Four ； China National Aviation 
Corporation 
In the latest event in 1995, CPA tried to defense against the CNAC's 
plan to launch a rival Hong Kong based airlines by competing directly w i th 
her. CPA decided to sell her shares in the airline herself and in Dragonair to 
CITIC and CNAC respectively in order to dilute the threat of CNAC as a 
competitor. The deal made CNAC the largest shareholder of Dragonair w i th 
almost 36 percent. 
Industry Growth 
Two major events happened during the period. This includes (1) the 
s lowdown of the global aviation industry; and (2) the wor ldwide excess of 
capacity and continuation of warfare. 
Event One : Slowdown of Global 
Aviation Industry 
Slow industry growth means more competit ion for market share. The 
triggering event for the industry downturn was the outbreak of the gulf war 
and the associated high fuel cost in late 1991. This resulted in a low revenue 
growth for the three consecutive years starting from 1991. SQ and JAL 
recorded the similar low revenue growth. 
CPA reacted by adapting the cost leadership strategy. She introduced 
the "Operations Better Shape" in the beginning of 1992. This was a two year 
project to streamline the operations and boost competitiveness. 
When taken into account on the expansion plan, (the Available Ton 
Kilometer), her unit operating cost is the best among SQ and JAL. However, 
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the control of the growth of the operating cost seemed to be the most 
successful for SQ. 
Event Two : Worldwide Excess of 
Capacity and Continuation of 
Warfare 
With the more fierce competit ion in the international airline industry, 
CPA responded by adapting strategic alliance tactics in bui lding up its route 
network. CPA has joined the frequent flyer program in conjunction wi th a 
number of major Asian and American airlines since 1992. She also operated 
joint venture wi th other airlines in order to enjoy an economy of scope in 
operation. 
However, it was observed that CPA's policy was to cooperate in the 
route or feeder operation only which did not involve cross-ownership. Their 
commercial director, Mr. Rod Eddington, said in 1989, "We think alliance are 
very important. But we'd rather put funds into our own business rather than 
someone else's. I am not sure cross-ownership would necessarily make things 
smoother." This was further reinforced by the chairman of CPA, Mr. Peter 
Sutch in 1992, "If there are good commercial and marketing reasons for 
groupings like that to come about, you don't need the equity to br ing it 
about. The rewards of work ing together should hold it together. The equity 
actually becomes a complicating fac to r . 
Forming a holding company or consortium that would coordinate 
marketing, scheduling and other operations would be one way of 
globalization of the company. This could be somewhat like the company that 
three major international airlines, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and Northwest 
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Airlines are considering. Although government approval is required, means 
could be sought to get around the government restrictions. Several 
advantages could be achieved through this global alliance. 
• The home carrier do possess a competitive advantage by occupying 
the predominated takeoff and landing slots in the home airport. 
• International airlines also can develop the hub-and-spoke systems 
that emerged in the US. Point-to-point route structures are 
vulnerable because they rely solely on the demand for travel 
between two cities. Hub-and-spoke systems increase the traffic on 
individual routes by mixing together alliance carrier's passengers 
traveling to different destinations. That fills planes and increases 
profits. Thus avoiding the flying to the remote places. 
However, CPA did not adopt this approach. Instead, CPA tried to 
maximize the economy of scope by code sharing with other airlines, jo in ing 
the frequent flier programs and sharing of the computerized reservation 
systems. However, this type of alliance appears not be so important in the 
global arena. They are no longer new, and most major carriers are 
determined to be competitive with both. Hence, the resulting effects are not 
apparent. 
CPA also tried to differentiate its products against major Asian carrier 
by emphasizing its Marco Polo class and the quality of its inflight services. 
However, it was proved in the past few years that quality is not the 
differentiator as the air transport become more common. Traveling by air is 
no longer a prestige. Then as Nomani, (Asian Wall Street Journal, January 
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1992) argued, "The absence of quality service is disastrous, but high quality in 
and of itself isn't going to produce a successful airline something not expected 
to make much difference is the quality of in-flight service." Even though 
international travelers tend to put more emphasis on service than domestic 
ones do, most of the world's major lines can match each other in offering 
basic and similar amenities in the cabin. 
Internal Factor Costs 
Basically there are one major events happened in Hong Kong during 
the studied period. High input cost, including the substantially increased in 
the fuel cost and inflation rate in Hong Kong. 
Both the gross margin and the return on equity for CPA recorded a 
declining trend. A 48.2 percent reduction in gross margin over the studied 
period was recorded which represented a year-on-year reduction of 10 
percent. The return on equity showed a 56.7 percent reduction over the 
studied period which represented a year-on year reduction of 12.9 percent. 
CPA's response was to introduce the "Operation Better Shape" 
programme in order to lower the input cost and to speed up the globalisation 
of its operation in order to avoid the high inflation in Hong Kong. 
Table 10 show that there is a 9 percent per year improvement in 
productivity for CPA (measured in ATK per staff) since 1991, fo l lowing the 
implementation of 'Operation Better Shape' introduced in 1992. Between 
1991 and 1994, unit costs (defined as airline operating costs excluding 
finance charges per ATK) fell at a rate of 2.5 percent per year. However, even 
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this effort was not sufficient to offset the 3.8 percent annual drop in traffic 
revenues per ATK. 
Staff are CPA's single largest cost component and represent the main 
challenge currently being addressed by the group. Unit staff costs have fallen 
more slowly than overall unit cost since 1991, at 1.4 percent per year. Table 
10 revealed that some benefits from the relocation of back-office operations 
to lower cost venues such as Guangzhou and Sydney, the home-basing of 
some expatriate staff, as well as the implementation of an agreement wi th its 
pilots for a 12 percent productivity rise in exchange for a 10 percent annual 
salary increment. CPA's pilots may only account for 8 percent of total staff in 
numbers, but the make up an estimated 50 percent of the airline's wage bil l. 
In late 1995, CPA set up a company for its freighter operations to recruit 
crews based in North America, Europe and Australia at one-third of the cost of 




After consolidating the external environment variations and the 
corresponding responses made by CPA, we used the "Environmental 
Changes-Strategic Responses" profile that we proposed in the earlier section 
{Exhibit 3 in Chapter 11. Literature Review) as a framework to assess the 
development characteristics of CPA. A number of variations from the 
expected responses observed. 
The primary response that CPA made when she faced the change in 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong was to change and position its company image 
as an Asian carrier, with the understanding that the usual support from the 
British Hong Kong Government would rapidly diminish. Also, her attempt to 
build up closer relationship with the PRC government and business alliances 
with the China counterparts became explicit since this future rul ing 
government could impede her operations. This was consistent wi th our 
proposed changes-responses profile, both in terms of t iming and sequence of 
actions. 
However, we noticed that our profile had not fully addressed the 
impact of the change in the government's economic regulations. In the event 
of the Hong Kong government's decision on constructing a new airport at 
Chek Lap Kok, the existing capacity limit of the local aviation industry was 
50 
expected to be removed. CPA immediately responded with the expansion in 
her fleet. She took the preemptive strategy, seeking to lock up a major 
portion of the market to discourage her competitors from expanding and to 
deter entry. This reflects that the change in legal environment, especially 
economic regulations, could be a source for the initiation of a firm to expand 
its business capacity and to introduce more services. 
The primary action that CPA reacted to the rivalry was to take a "strike 
and take" approach. She tried to build an entry barrier by getting the 
potential rivals under her control. The buying of the Dragonair and the 
acquisition of the AHK followed this tactic. However, instead of integrating 
these acquired companies into her structure, CPA still kept them as individual 
business entities and reallocated the routes among the companies. This 
approach aimed not only to improve efficiency but also to hedge and add 
flexibil ity to new route entry and expansion of flight frequencies. 
If the situation is outside her control, CPA turned to the alliance 
strategy. Her attempt to team up with the CNAC is a typical example. This 
also falls into the aspect of alliance and globalization. 
The above events illustrate that CPA always tried to avoid direct 
competition with the rivals which may lead to inefficient use of resources or 
increasing uncertainty. 
When competition is unavoidable, CPA's reaction became slow. As in 
the case of Virgin Atlantic, she tended to adapt a follower approach and the 
lead time for the introduction of new counteracting services was long. 
However, her consistent good performance indicated that this approach was 
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appropriate (or at least did not induce any harm) and the response lag was 
irrelevant. This greatly reflected the rationale of CPA that she wi l l not be a 
risk taker but a quick follower, if possible. 
Whi le cost control played an important role in coping with periods of 
slow industry growth, alliance is the main theme of CPA's responses to the 
changes related to the industry growth, which is consistent with our proposed 
profile. This was done through joint venture, code sharing and establishing a 
frequent flyer program with other airlines. 
However, due to the homogeneity of the services, differentiation in the 
company image was put forward by CPA, with the change of her company 
livery, the launch of new promotional campaign and the additional of new 
elements to her products. With this, she ensure a better position to increase 
her customer base and market share. 
Cost control approach is the prime response that CPA undertook 
towards the internal factor costs. The globalization tactic and the joint 
development of the airline reservation systems are two means for CPA to take 
the economy of scale. Also, the streamlining of her structure and operations 
played another important role in controll ing her internal costs against the high 
inflation rate of her home base, Hong Kong. 
In summary, CPA has responded in a very similar manner as what we 
expected and laid down in the proposed "Environmental Changes-Strategic 
Responses" profile. However, due to the special characteristics of the 
aviation industry and the rationale of the company, CPA had taken a different 
sequence in her responses in some occasions. 
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However, the study did reveal some responses that we have 
overlooked. These deviations of CPA's responses from the original profile are 
mainly contributed by the specific characteristics of the Hong Kong aviation 
industry while the original response profile is generated from the experience 
of the US domestic airline industry. Different aspects of the environmental 
changes, especially the unique legal / political environment of Hong Kong, 
the nature of rivalry, and the foreign background of CPA impose variations in 
her choice of responses. Also, the company's rationale in being a quick 
follower instead of a first mover is liable for the differences. 
However, this phenomenon of variations reveals that the proposed 
relationship of the environmental changes and the corresponding responses 
(Exhibit 3) have not addressed the dynamic nature of the issue, both the 
choice of responses and their sequence. Taken this into consideration, the 
profile is revised as shown in Exhibit 6. 
ExHiBiT 6. Revised "Environmental Changes-
Strategic Responses" Profile. 
Types of Responses^ 
fnv/ronmenta/ Factor I II III IV V 
Legal / Political Environment X X X 
Intensity of Rivalry X X 
Industry Growth X X X 
Internal Factor Cost X X 




The purpose of the study has been to identify a framework to examine 
the dynamic impact of a changing external environment on strategic 
responses. A framework and a "environmental changes-strategic responses" 
profile were established based on the findings of the literature review. They 
have then been applied to a wel l performed airline, Cathay Pacific Airways, 
to illustrate how a f irm maintains an appropriate fit between the environment 
and strategies. On the whole, the case of CPA is held to be illustrative of the 
framework and the response profile. 
The framework has provided a structured way to examine the 
environment-response relationship and the response profile has shown how a 
f irm can act and in what sequence to the external environmental changes, 
typically of the legal / political environment, the intensity of rivalry, the 
industry growth and the internal factor costs. 
Wi th reference to the case of CPA, the results contribute to enrich our 
understanding of how a Hong Kong based company responds to the specific 
environmental changes arising in the territory by suggesting some possible 
responses that can be considered when facing a particular environmental 
variation. Moreover, the results suggest that the sequence of responses and 
the response lag can be different from what is expected by the theory, taken 
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into consideration of the specific characteristics of different industries and 
rationales of companies. Therefore, the sequence of responses indicated in 
the original "Environmental Changes-Strategic Responses" profile becomes 
irrelevant. Instead, the choice of the response sequence becomes dynamic in 
nature based on the particular industry where the company is in, the 
particular environmental changes that the company is facing and the 
particular characteristics of the company, such as its rationale, its position in 
the industry, its strengths and weaknesses, etc. 
The external environmental changes encountered by CPA are common 
to the other Hong Kong based companies. Although their industries may be 
different, CPA's experience and her responses to the environmental variations 
are worth a close look. The deviations of CPA's responses from the original 
"Environmental Changes-Strategic Responses" profile suggest that the choice 
of responses and their sequence are dynamic. This implies that managers 
should have a full understanding in their particular industry and their 
corporate before formulating the responses and their sequence so as to 
maintain an appropriate fit to the environment and strategies. Nevertheless, 
the revised response profile does provide a good starting point for the 
managers to consider possible competitive moves. 
Although the findings of this study are encouraging, as in any study 
there are limitations. One concern is that this study only examined a single 
company in a particular industry with publicly available data. There could be 
biases that have not been averaged out and hidden facts that have not been 
revealed. The information from the annual reports and the newspapers may 
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miss very subtle actions or consider some actions not important enough to 
report. 
Further research should strive for maximizing the sample size of 
studies in order to draw most valid conclusions of the environment-response 
relationship. 
Also, to better link research with management practice, and to 
minimize the uncertainties connected to the use of published information, as 
mentioned above, further studies should include active participation of senior 
management, possibly represented by strategy and corporate development 
departments. A trade-off of such an approach would be that the use of 
proprietary information would constrain the possibilities for publication of 
such a study. Nevertheless, increased certainty and validity of conclusions 
combined with publication of a partially anonymous benchmarking exercise 
should be adequately serve both the research community and management 
practice. 
Another important issue is the extent to which these results can be 
generalized. It should be noted that a single-industry study is most 
appropriate for this kind of investigation. Using multi-industry data might 
introduce substantial variation in response characteristics from extraneous 
factors, such as different industry maturity. By l imit ing the study to a single 
industry, we reduced variation in response characteristics from extrinsic 
factors, a l lowing a purer test of the theory. Nonetheless, the airl ine industry 
does possess some distinctive features that could be germane to the study's 
generalizability. 
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Although the aviation industry is unusual in some respects, it shares 
characteristics with many other industries. Still, the present results should be 
considered preliminary and exploratory, and caution should be exercised in 
generalizingthem to other industries. 
Therefore, examination of the topic in other industries is needed to 
establish the generalizability of the key environment-response relationships 
found in this study. The framework and response profile established here 
provides a basis for such additional investigations. 
Subsequent research might also examine other variables not included 
in this study. For instance, how management changes, internal organization 
and structure alternations, etc. affect the response formulation and choice 
should receive future research attention. 
In conclusion, researchers can obtain a more complete picture of 
competitive advantage by focusing their attention on the specific responses of 
a firm. Such an orientation can succinctly capture the dynamics of strategy 
and environment and greatly enrich understanding of how firms build 
competitive advantage out of environmental changes and uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The total international scheduled passenger traffic and the composition 
of Asia-Pacific Traffic to and from Hong Kong are provided in the two tables 
as follows. 
T A B L E 2 
TOTAL INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED PASSENCERlRAFFIC 
T O A N D FROM H O N C K O N C B V W O R L D REGION 
Total 
International 
Europe Americas Asia-Pacific Rest of W o r l d Passengers 
Passengers Annual Passengers Annual Passengers Annual Passengers Annual Passengers Annual 
('000) growth ('000) growth ('000) growth ('000) growth ('000) growth 
1985 775.0 425.5 8,015.9 118.4 9,334.8 
1986 853.2 10.1% 559.0 31.4% 8,943.7 11.6% 127.3 7.6% 10,483.2 12.3% 
1987 1,029.7 20.77o 663.6 18.7% 10,643.8 19.07。 142.2 11.7% 12,479.3 19.0% 
1988 1,147.6 11.4% 776.1 16.9% 13,043.6 22.5% 145.1 2.1% 15,112.3 21.1% 
1989 1,228.4 7.07。 840.4 8.3% 13,869.8 6.37。 158.8 9.4% 16,097.4 6.5% 
1990 1,351.9 10.07。 988.8 17.77。16,008.3 15.4% 194.9 22.77。18,543.8 15.2% 
1991 1,357.1 0.4% 1,139.0 15.2% 16,323.3 2.0% 186.2 -4.4% 19,005.6 2.5% 
1992 1,551.6 14.3% 1,351.1 18.67。18,774.7 15.0。/。 258.0 38.57。21,935.3 15.4% 
1993 1,751.6 12.9% 1,495.9 10.7% 20,830.3 10.97。 285.9 10.8% 24,363.1 11.1% 
1994 2,090.1 19.4% 1,669.5 11.6% 21,082.0 1.2% 335.1 17.2% 25,176.7 3.3% 
1995 2,126.1 1.7% 1,910.2 14.4% 22,947.4 8.87。 337.0 0.6% 27,320.6 8.57。 
2000 2,982.9 7.0% 2,707.9 7.2% 32,442.3 7.2% 471.8 7.0% 38,605.0 7.2% 
2010 5,228.7 5.8% 4,737.4 5.87。59,973.8 6.37。 815.3 5.6% 70,755.1 6.2% 
Source: International Air Transport Association (IATA). Asia-Pacific Air 
Transport Forecast: 1980-2010. IATAJanuary 1997^ 
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TABLE 10 
PAST A N D FUTURE COMPOSITION OF ASIA-PACIFIC TRAFFIC 
T O A N D FROM H O N G K O N G 
Total 
South Northeast Southeast South Asia-Pacific 
Asia Asia Asia Pacific Passengers® 
Passengers Annual Passengers Annual Passengers Annual Passengers Annual Passengers Annual 
('000) growth ('000) growth ('000) growth ('000) growth ('000) growth 
1985 158.4 4,305.3 2,924.4 627.7 8,015.9 
1986 196.6 24.1% 4,809.9 11.7% 3,258.1 11.4% 679.1 8.2% 8,943.7 11.6% 
1987 187.9 -4.4% 5,908.8 22.87。3,849.0 18.17。 698.0 2.8% 10,643.8 19.0% 
1988 184.3 -1.97。7,801.7 32.07。4,305.5 11.9% 752.0 7.77。13,043.6 22.5% 
1989 214.2 16.27。8,213.1 5.37。4,650.8 8.07。 791/7 5.3% 13,869.8 6.3% 
1990 232.2 8.4% 10,063.5 22.5% 4,986.6 7.2% 726.0 -8.3% 16,008.3 15.4% 
1991 240.1 3.4% 10,373.1 3.1% 4,961.6 -0.5% 748.6 3.1% 16,323.3 2.0% 
1992 292.5 21.87。12,132.5 17.0% 5,528.3 11.4。/。 821.4 9.77。18,774.7 15.0% 
1993 258.1 -11.87o 13,525.8 11.5% 6,145.4 11.2% 901.1 9.7% 20,830.3 10.9% 
1994 271.5 5.2% 13,344.7 -1 .37。6,421.4 4.57。1,044.4 15.9% 21,082.0 1.2% 
1995 313.2 15.47。14,353.9 7.6% 7,089.0 10.4% 1,191.3 14.1% 22,947.4 8.8% 
2000 412.3 5.7% 20,309.2 7.2% 10,037.6 7.2 1,683.1 7.2% 32,442.3 7.2% 
2010 748.4 6.1% 37,500.5 6.3% 18,634.7 6.4% 3,090.1 6.37。39,973.8 6.3% 
Source: International Air Transport Association (IATA). Asia-Pacific Air 
Transport Forecast: 1980-2010. I A T A J a n u a r y 1 9 9 ^ 
a Includes, whenever applicable, traffic to and from Central Asia. 
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APPENDIX 2 
The detailed statistics of the operational performance of CPA versus 
JAL and SQ are listed in the tables in the fol lowing pages. 
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TABLE 10 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — lNPUTS 
OF CPA, JAL AND SQ 
CPA JAL SQ 
1. Available Ton Kilometer (mil l ion) 
• 1989 4,753 12,126 6,280 
• 1990 5,429 12,138 6,644 
• 1991 5,621 13,336 7,624 
. 1 9 9 2 6,466 13,692 8,982 
• 1993 7,212 13,914 10,156 
• 1994 8,052 15,388 11,167 
• 1995 8,946 16,724 12,481 '' 
2. Non-flight Assets ($ mil l ion) 
HK$ US$ S$ 
• 1989 781 2,612 724 
• 1990 949 3,639 1,238 
• 1991 1,020 4,672 1,372 
• 1992 1,127 5,809 1,326 
• 1993 1,109 7,092 1,405 
• 1994 1,301 9,070 1,533 
• 1995 1,495 6,966 1,802 
3. Operating Cost ($ mil l ion) 
HK$ US$ 1$ 
• 1989 13,341 7,385 3,602 
• 1990 16,200 9,413 3,760 
. 1 9 9 1 17,282 10,519 4,149 
• 1992 19,685 11,456 4,480 
• 1993 20,225 12,487 5,026 
• 1994 22,698 15,292 5,124 
• 1995 25,288 13,506 5,496 
Source: Annual Reports (1989-1995) of Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 
Japan A i r l i nes Co . Ltd. and S ingapore A i r l i nes Ltd. 
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TABLE 10 
A COMPARISON OF OPERATION PERFORMANCE — lNPUTS 
A M O N G C P A , JAL A N D S Q 
^ 1 ^ S Q 
1. Avai lable Ton Kilometer Growth 
• 1990 14.27o 0.1% 5.87o 
• 1991 3.57。 9.97o 14.8% 
• 1992 15.0% 2.77。 17.8% 
• 1993 11.5% 1.6% 13.17。 
• 1994 11.67。 10.67o 10.0% 
• 1995 11.17o 8.7% 11.8% 
• 
•Mean 11.2% 5.6% 12.2% 
‘Variance 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
=> ANOVA: Reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Reject Ho that /jcPA <^m at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Do not reject Ho that ficPA<fisQ at a = 0.05. 
2. Non-f l ight Assets Growth 
• 1990 21.5% 39.37。 70.9% 
• 1991 7.5% 28.4% 10.8% 
• 1992 10.5% 24.3% - 3 . 4 % 
• 1993 - 1 . 6 % 21.67。 6 .0% 
• 1994 17.3% 28.4% 9 .1% 
• 1995 14.97o -23.27o 17.5% 
- M e a n 11.7% 19.8% 18.5% 
‘Variance 0.7% 4.8% 7.1% 
=> ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a - 0.05. 
3. Operat ing Cost Growth 
• 1990 21.4% 27.57o 4 .4% 
• 1991 6.77。 11.77。 10.3% 
• 1992 13.97o 8.9% 8 .0% 
• 1993 2.7% 9.07o 2 .2% 
• 1994 12.2% 22.50/0 1.97o 
• 1 9 9 5 11.4% - 1 1 . 7 % 7.3% 
-Mean 11.4% 11.3% 5.7% 
‘Variance 0.4% 1.9% 0.1% 
=> ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
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TABLE 10 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — OUTPUTS 
OF CPA, SQ ANDjAL 
CPA JAL SQ 
1. Revenue Passenger Kilometer (mil l ion) 
• 1989 22,088 54,248 30,737 
• 1990 24,461 52,363 31,332 
• 1991 24,433 57,990 34,894 
• 1992 27,527 57,937 37,861 
• 1993 29,097 60,712 42,328 
• 1994 32,727 68,527 45,414 
• 1995 35,341 76,721 50,045 ‘ 
2. Non-passenger Revenue ($ mil l ion) 
HK$ US$ 廷 
• 1989 3,475 N/A 724 
• 1990 4,160 1,662 1,238 
• 1991 4,648 2,020 1,372 
• 1992 5,254 2,235 1,326 
• 1993 5,895 2,808 1,405 
• 1994 7,394 3,830 1,533 
• 1995 8 ^ 3,601 1,802 
Source: Annual Reports (1989-1995) of Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 
Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. and Singapore Airlines Ltd. 
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TABLE 10 
A COMPARISON OF OPERATION PERFORMANCE — OUTPUTS 
A M O N G C P A , JAL A N D S Q 
^ 1 ^ SQ 
1. Revenue Passenger Kilometer Growth 
• 1990 10.7% 3.5% 1.9% 
• 1991 0 .1% 10.77o 11.47o 
• 1 9 9 2 12.7% - 0 . 1 % 8.5% 
• 1993 5.7% 4 .8% 11.8% 
• 1994 12.5% 12.9% 7.3% 
• 1995 8 M 12X)% 10.2% 
'Mean sl% /1% 8.5% • 
• Variance 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
=> ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
2. Non-passenger Revenue Growth 
• 1990 19.7% N/A 1.9% 
• 1991 11.7% 21.5% 11.4% 
• 1992 13.0% 10.6% 8.5% 
• 1993 12.2% 25.6% 11.8% 
• 1994 25.4% 36.4% 7.3% 
‘ 1 9 9 5 15.2% 6 M 10.2% 
'Mean /6.2% 20.0% 8.5% 
• Variance 0.3% 1.5% 0.1% 
=> ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
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TABLE 10 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — AlRLINE STATISTICS (REVENUE RELATED) 
OF CPA, JALANDSQ 
CPA JAL SQ 
1. Return on Equity 
. 1 9 8 9 0.408 0.043 0.218 
. 1 9 9 0 0.302 0.033 0.147 
• 1991 0.258 (0.033) 0.132 
• 1992 0.227 (0.141) 0.111 
• 1993 0.161 (0.124) 0.097 
• 1994 0.157 (0.052) 0.102 
• 1995 0.178 (0.034) 0.105 
2. Gross Margin 
• 1989 0.226 0.045 0.282 
• 1990 0.181 0.020 0.235 
• 1991 0.172 (0.008) 0.205 
• 1992 0.152 (0.043) 0.167 
• 1993 0.109 (0.032) 0.140 
• 1994 0.110 (0.012) 0.146 
. 1 9 9 5 0.117 (0.006) 0.157 
3. Passenger Load Factor 
• 1989 77.67o 74.3% 78.3% 
. 1 9 9 0 75.9% 73.2% 75.17。 
• 1991 73.67o 72.40/0 73.50/。 
• 1992 73.57。 67.67。 71.3% 
• 1993 70.0% 66.37。 71.4% 
• 1994 71.37o 67.97o 70.9% 
• 1995 71.67。 68.87。 73.0% 
4. Percentage Passenger Revenue 
• 1989 79.97。 N/A 77.0% 
• 1990 79.07o 82.8% 78.1% 
• 1991 77.8% 80.77o 78.3% 
• 1992 77.50/0 79.8% 77.47o 
• 1993 75.40/0 77.0% 76.6% 
• 1994 72.87o 74.7% 75.8% 
• 1995 72.07o 73.67o 75.6% 
Source: Annual Reports (1989-1995) of Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 
Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. and Singapore Airlines Ltd. 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — AlRLINE STATISTICS (REVENUE RELATED) 
OF CPA, SQ AND JAL 
CPA JAL SQ 
5. Revenue Growth 
• 1989 14.47。 15.07。 N/A 
• 1990 14.7% 7.87。 -2 .87。 
• 1991 5.67。 2.17。 9.6% 
• 1992 11.37。 - 7 . 1 % 4.27。 
• 1993 3.07o - 2 . 1 % 10.47o 
• 1 9 9 4 13.4% 7.30/0 5.17o 
• 1995 11.90/。 7.57。 5.1% 
Source: A n n u a l Reports ( 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 5 ) of Cathay Pacif ic A i rways L im i ted , 
Japan A i r l ines Co. Ltd. and Singapore A i r l i nes Ltd. 
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TABLE 10 
A COMPARISON OF OPERATION PERFORMANCE — AlRLINE STATISTICS 
(REVENUE RELATED) A M O N G C P A , JAL A N D S Q 
C P A JAL S Q 
1. Return on Equity 
HK$ US$ 驻 
. 1 9 8 9 0.408 0.043 0.218 
• 1990 0,302 0.033 0 .147 
• 1991 0.258 (0.033) 0.132 
• 1992 0.227 (0.141) 0.111 
• 1993 0.161 (0.124) 0 .097 
• 1994 0.157 (0.052) 0 .102 
• 1 9 9 5 0.178 (0.034) 0.105 
- M e a n 0.242 (0.044) 0 . / 3 0 
-Variance 0.008 0.005 0.002 
=> ANOVA: Reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Reject Ho that fjcpA <^iAi at a = 0,05. 
=> t-Test: Reject Ho that ficPA <n$Q at a = 0.05. 
2. Gross Margin 
• 1989 0.226 0.045 0.282 
• 1990 0.181 0.020 0.235 
• 1991 0.172 (0.008) 0.205 
• 1992 0.152 (0.043) 0 .167 
• 1993 0.109 (0.032) 0 .140 
• 1994 1.110 (0.012) 0 .146 
• 1995 0.117 (0.006) 0 .157 
'Mean 0.152 (0.005) 0./90 
' V a " a n c e 0.002 0.001 0.003 
=> ANOVA: Reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Reject Ho that 陣 <^m at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Do not reject Ho that fdcpA <^sQ at a = 0.05. 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
A COMPARISON OF OPERATION PERFORMANCE — AlRLINE STATISTICS 
(REVENUE RELATED) A M O N G C P A , JAL A N D S Q 
C P A JAL S Q 
3. Passenger Load Factor 
• 1989 77.6% 74.37o 78.3% 
. 1 9 9 0 75.9% 73.2% 75.1% 
• 1991 73.6% 72.4% 73.5% 
. 1 9 9 2 73.5% 67.6% 71.3% 
• 1993 70.07。 66.37。 71.4% 
. 1 9 9 4 71.37。 67.9% 70.9% 
• 1995 71.67。 68.87。 73.0% 
'Mean 73.4% 70.1% 73.4% 
‘Variance 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
=> ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
4. Percentage Passenger Revenue 
• 1989 79.9% N /A 77.0% 
• 1990 79.07o 82.8% 78.1% 
• 1991 77.8% 80.7% 78.3% 
• 1992 77.5% 79.87o 77.4% 
• 1993 75.47o 77.0% 76.6% 
• 1994 72.8% 74.7% 75.8% 
• 1995 72.0% 73.67o 75.6% 
-Mean 76.3% 78.1% 77.0% 
-Variance 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
=^ ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
5. Revenue Growth 
• 1989 14.47。 15.07。 N /A 
• 1990 14.77o 7.87o - 2 . 8 % 
• 1991 5.67。 2.17o 9 .6% 
• 1992 11.3% - 7 . 1 % 4 .2% 
• 1993 3.0% - 2 . 1 % 10.47o 
• 1994 13.4% 7.3% 5 .1% 
• 1995 11.97。 7.57。 5 .1% 
'Mean /0.6% 71% 5.3% 
‘Variance 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 
=> ANOVA: Do not reject Ho that all means are equal at a - 0.05. 
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TABLE 10 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — PASSENCERYlELD, REVENUE PER A T K , 
UNIT COST AND MlLLION ATKS PER STAFF 
OF CPA, JAL AND SQ 
CPA JAL SQ 
1. Revenue per RPK (Passenger Yield) 
HK$ US$ 廷 
• 1989 0.625 N/A 0.128 
. 1 9 9 0 0.640 0.153 0.123 
• 1991 0.667 0.146 0.122 
. 1 9 9 2 0.656 0.152 0.115 
• 1993 0.623 0.155 0.113 
• 1994 0.606 0.165 0.109 
• 1995 0.621 0.131 0.104 
2. Revenue per ATK 
HK$ US$ 经 
• 1 9 8 9 3.635 0.655 0.811 
• 1990 3.650 0.796 0.745 
• 1991 3.724 0.785 0.711 
• 1992 3.604 0.808 0.629 
• 1993 3.329 0.877 0.614 
• 1994 3.380 0.985 0.587 
• 1995 3.404 0.817 0.552 
3. Operating Cost per ATK (Unit Cost) 
HK$ US$ 缝 
• 1989 2.807 0.609 0.574 
• 1990 2.984 0.776 0.556 
• 1991 3.075 0.789 0.544 
• 1992 3.044 0.837 0.499 
• 1993 2.804 0.897 0.495 
• 1994 2.819 0.994 0.459 
• 1995 2.827 0.808 0.440 
Source: Annual Reports (1989-1995) of Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 
Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. and Singapore Airlines Ltd. 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — PASSENGER YlELD, REVENUE PERATK, 
UNIT COST AND MlLLION ATKS PER STAFF 
OF CPA, JAL ANDSQ 
CPA JAL SQ 
4. Mi l l ion ATKs per Staff 
• 1989 0.405 N/A 0.625 
• 1990 0.426 N/A 0.614 
. 1 9 9 1 0.441 N/A 0.668 
. 1 9 9 2 0.488 N/A 0.749 
. 1 9 9 3 0.512 N/A 0.821 
. 1 9 9 4 0.557 N/A 0.889 
• 1995 0.607 N/A 0.963 
Source: Annual Reports (1989-1995) of Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, 
Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. and Singapore Airlines Ltd. 
a The 'Number of Staff' information is not available in the Annual Reports of 
Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. 
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TABLE 10 
A COMPARISON OF OPERATION PERFORMANCE — PASSENGER YlELD, 
REVENUE PER A T K , UNIT COST A N D MlLL ION A T K PER STAFF 
A M O N G C P A , JAL A N D S Q 
C P A JAL S Q 
1. Revenue per RPK (Passenger Yield) 
HK$ HK$ HK$ 
(US$1:HK$7.74) (S$:HK$^) 
• 1989 0.625 N/A 0.687 
• 1990 0.640 1.184 0.660 
• 1991 0.667 1.130 0.654 
• 1992 0.656 1.176 0 .617 
• 1993 0.623 1.200 0.606 
• 1994 0.606 1.277 0.585 
• 1995 0.621 1.014 0.558 
'Mean 0.636 / . / 6 4 0.613 
‘Variance 0.001 0.008 0.002 
=> ANOVA: Reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
^ t-Test: Reject Ho that 陣 <^jAL at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Do not reject Ho that ^cPA <^sQ at a = 0.05, 
2. Revenue per ATK 
HK$ HK$ HK$ 
(US$ l:HK$7.74) (S$:HK$nr) 
• 1989 3.635 5.070 4.351 
• 1990 3.650 6.161 3.997 
• 1991 3.724 6.076 3.815 
• 1992 3.604 6.254 3.375 
• 1993 3.329 6.788 3.294 
• 1994 3.380 7.624 3.149 
• 1995 3.404 6.324 2.961 
'Mean 3.532 6.325 3.563 
• Variance 0.025 0.595 0.252 
=> ANOVA: Reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
^ t-Test: Do not reject Ho that jucPA <^iAi at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Reject Ho that /icpA <^sQ at a = 0.05. 
71 
TABLE 10 (Continued) 
A COMPARISON OF OPERATION PERFORMANCE — PASSENGER YlELD, 
REVENUE PER A T K , UNIT COST A N D MlLL ION A T K PER STAFF 
A M O N G C P A , J A L A N D S Q 
CPA JAL SQ 
3. Operat ing Cost per ATK (Unit Cost) 
HK$ HK$ HK$ 
(US$ 1:HK$7J4) (5$:HK$5Jej 
• 1989 2.807 4.714 3.080 
• 1990 2.984 6.006 2.983 
• 1991 3.075 6.107 2.919 
• 1992 3.044 6.478 2 .677 
• 1993 2.804 6.943 2.656 
• 1994 2.819 7.694 2.463 
• 1995 2.827 6.254 2.361 
'Mean 2.909 6 . 3 / 4 2.734 
-Variance 0.015 0.838 0.073 
=> ANOVA: Reject Ho that all means are equal at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Do not reject Ho that 陣 <^,Ai at a = 0.05. 
=> t-Test: Reject Ho that ficPA <jusQ at a = 0.05. 
4. M i l l i o n ATKs per Staf f 
• 1989 0.405 0.625 
• 1990 0.426 0 .614 
• 1991 0.441 0.668 
• 1992 0.488 0.749 
• 1993 0.512 0.821 
• 1994 0 .557 0.889 
• 1995 0 .607 0.963 
'Mean 0.491 . o.76/ 
-Variance 0.005 o.018 
=> t-Test: Do not reject Ho that jucPA </ i$q at a = 0.05. 
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APPENDIX 3 
T A B L E 1 2 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE — INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER LOAD FACTOR OF 
C P A , JAL , KE, S Q A N D T G 
CPA JAL KE SQ TG 
4. International Passenger Load Factor 
• 1989 78% 75% 74% 79% 74% ‘ 
• 1990 767。 77% 73% 777。 727。 
• 1991 71% 70% N/A 737。 62% 
• 1992 73% 70% 61% 71% 62% 
• 1993 70% 67% 65% 71% 67% 
• 1994 71% 72% 63% 71% 68% 
‘ 1 9 9 5 72% 71% 64% 72% 68% 
'Mean 73% zI% VK J^� 68^ 
• Industrial Mean 77 % 
Source : A d v a n c e d A i r T ra f f i c Repor t (1996) o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i v i l 
A v i a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n . 
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APPENDIX 3 
The matrix listing major industry and external environmental changes 
relevant to Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. is shown below. 
Events 
1989 1990 r ^ i ^ 
1. Legal / • Hong Kong • Government 
Political announced raised charges 
Environment plan for the and taxes of 
Chek Lap Kok airport facilities 
丨 Airport to be 




3. Industry • Outbreak of • Slowdown of • Outbreak of • Wor ldw ide 
Growth the Tienanmen global aviation Gu l fWar excess of 
Square event, business leadingto capacity and 
leading to a expected recession in the continuation of 
severe drop in global fare wars 
the number of economy and 
tourists and rise in fuel cost • Many airlines 
businessmen expected to 
visit ing China • Fa「e wars report loss in 
started in 1992 
regions such as _ . . . . 
North America • t ra f f ic in 
and Australia general under 
expectation 
4. Internal • High personnel • High inflation • High inflation 
Factors and fuel costs rate in Hong rate and airport 
Kong and high charges and 




1993 1994 1995 
1 • Legal / Political • Negotiation of new 
Environment airport underway 
hindered expansion 
2. Rivalry Intensity • In February, Virgin • Application for AOC 
Atlantic started approval in Hong 
regular flights in Kong by CNAC 
London rotit6 ^ . , 
• Opening of Macau 
Airport 
3. Industry Growth • Downturn in air • Kobe earthquake, 
transport growth leading to a sharp 
decrease in the 
number of Japanese 
travelers 
• European market 
under fierce 
competit ion and 
over capacity 
4. Internal Factors • High inflation rate 
in Hong Kong 




The matrix listing major responses / actions of Cathay Pacific Airways 




1- New • Launched in January a series of 
Promotion advertising campaigns, Cathay 
Pacific's "New Direct ion", 
designed to reposition the 
airline's image: emphasizing her 
cosmopolitan personality and 
capitalizing on her position as 
the only genuinely international 
carrier in Asia/Pacific 
2. New Services / • Entered into a management 
Services services agreement to manage 
Improvement Dragonair. 
• Marco Polo Club services and 
benefits enhanced 
• Non-smoking flights introduced 
on Southeast Asian services 
• 'East Meets West' inflight cuisine 
introduced 
• Discovery Channel launched on 
inflight video 
• Abacus Computerized 
Reservations Systems fu l ly 
operational in Hong Kong 
• 2nd citycheck opened at Pacific 
Place, Hong Kong 
3. Dai ly • Frequencies of services increased • Frequencies of services increased 
Departure , , 
Increase/ • London (twice daily) • Europe, Australia,Singapore, 
Decrease • Paris (five times weekly) Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok 
• Rome and Zurich (three times • ^25 extra sectors f lown 
weekly) 
• 455 extra sectors f lown 
(including 2 weekly flights to 
east coast of Australia pending 
formal agreement at government 
level for scheduled capacity) 
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Responses 
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4. Route Exit / • New destinations • New destinations 
Entry 
• Manchester (twice weekly as • Los Angeles (four times 
an extension of the daily weekly) 
services to Frankfurt) _ 
• Sapporo (three times weekly) 
• Port Moresby (once weekly) • , 
• London Heathrow 
• Mauritius (once weekly) ‘ 
• Seoul, Paris and eastern 
• Destinations canceled Australia (freighter services) 
• Dhahran • Destinations canceled 
• Beijing and Shanghai 
(transferred to Dragonair) 
5. Frequent Flyer 
Program 
6. Acquisit ion of • New aircraft introduced • New aircraft introduced 
New Planes , ^ 
• 3 Boeing 747-400s (1 on a • 3 Boeing 747^00s 
short-term operating lease) 
• 1 Boeing 747"400 freighter 
• 3 Lockheed L1011 Tristars , , _^ , 
• 1 Lockheed L1011 Tristar 
• Outstanding commitments: 9 _ 」 
Boeing 747>400s • Outstanding commitments: 10 
Boeing 747^00s (including 2 
• Order placed: 1 Boeing 747-200 freighters) and 10Airbus A330-
freighter 300s 
• Options converted into f i rm • Options: 15 Boeing 747~400s 
orders: 4 Boeing 747>400s (to be and 14 Airbus A330-300s 
delivered in 1992) 
• Fleet size: 41 aircraft 
• Entered into an option agreement 
for further Boeing 747"400s 
• Made arrangements for future 
disposal of Lockheed Tristars in 
respect orders for 10Airbus 
A330s 




7. Corporation / • Joint venture w i th Air Niugini to • Cooperation w i th American 
Al l iance w i th operate Port Moresby Airl ines to offer connections to 
Other Air l ines • 门 , _ e w i th Air Maurit ius a = o m a hundred cities in 
to operate Maurit ius ， r t h Amer.ca or the Hong 
Kong-Los Angeles service 
• Joint service in partnership w i th 
Japan Air l ines to operate Sapporo 
• Joined IATA Trade Association 
• Global LogisticsSystem for cargo 
established w i th Air France, 
Japan Air l ines and Lufthansa 
• Abacus Computer ized 
Reservations System signed up 
10Qth participating air l ine 
8. Intra-industry • Purchased a 30% (240 mi l l i on 
Merger and shares of HK$1 each) interest in 
Acquisi t ion Hong Kong Dragon Air l ines Ltd. 
("Dragonair") through who l l y -
owned subsidiaries in January 
• Acquired a 50% interest in 
International Aviat ion Services 
(Hong Kong) Ltd. (previously 
known as Caledonian Far East 
Airways Ltd.) through who l l y -
owned subsidiary company in 
May 
9. Organizational • r ' intake of 9 trainees on the • 15 cadet pi lots graduated and 
Structure cadet pi lot scheme graduated in jo ined Cathay Pacific as 2"^ 
Changes October w h o served as 2"^ officers and a further of 30 
Off icers in Boeing 747-400 and a trainees involved in the scheme 
further 29 trainees involved in 
the scheme • HK$250 mi l l i on Data Center 




1 • New • Cathay Pacific's Hong Kong 
Promotion Super City campaign launched in 
June 
2. New Services / • The Cathay Pacific Commitment • New First Class lounge opened 
Services for the 90's unveiled at Kai Tak 
Improvement 
• Non-stop services to London • Cathay Pacific First launched in 
Heathrow and Zurich introduced March 
• Re-launch of first class product, • Non-smoking flights introduced 
under brand name Cathay Pacific on Australian, American and 
First, announced for early 1992 Canadian services 
• Chinese and Japanese sections 
added to the inflight magazine, 
Discovery 
• Non-stop services to Amsterdam, 
Jakarta and Penang introduced 
• Daily BBC TV news programmes 
joined the inflight entertainment 
line-up 
• Fax Check-in introduced for 
selected passengers in Hong 
Kong 
3. Dai ly • Frequencies of service increased • Frequencies of service increased 
Departure , , 
Increase / _ London Heathrow (daily, non- _ Brisbane, Hanoi, Ho Chi M inh 
Decrease stop) City, Manchester, Nagoya, 
• London Gatwick (daily) ParisandTaipei 
.LosAnge les (daily) - 498 extrasectorsf lown 
(primarily to Bangkok, Fukuoka, 
• East Australia, Nagoya and Kaohsiung, Mani la and Taipei) 
Kaohsiung 
• 387 extra sectors f lown 
(pr imar i ly to Bangkok, Taipei 




4. Route Exit / • New destinations • New destinations 
Entry • Johannesburg (onceweekly) • Adelaide (once weekly) 
• Ho Chi Minh City (twice • Cebu (four times weekly) 
weekly) 
• Los Angeles (freighter services) 
• Hanoi (twice weekly) 
• Destinations canceled 
• Port Moresby 
5. Frequent Flyer • Agreed with other Asian airlines 
Program to form a joint frequent flyer 
programme 
6. Acquisition of • New aircraft introduced • New aircraft introduced 
New Planes 
• 5 Boeing 747-400s (1 on an • 4 Boeing 747>400s 
operating lease) 
• Aircraft converted 
• 1 Boeing 747^00 (previously ^ ^ . 〜 ， … 
acquired on a short-term • ^ ^ ^ ^ g 747400 passenger 
operating lease) aircraft converted to a freighter 
• Options converted into firm • ^utstandrng commitments: 6 
orders: 3 Boeing 747-400s (to be ,^^.^'"g 7 ^ 7 " ^ 0 ^ (mcludmg 2 
delivered in 1993) [^ ' !^^ToU onn^'"^ . ' ' ° 
Airbus A330-300s and 1 
• Outstanding commitments: 9 Lockheed L1011 Tristar 
Boeing 747-400s (including 2 ^ . ,. , , „ . 
freighters) and 10 Airbus A330- • ? f ) i = ? ， m e ? : ^ B， n g 
3QQ° 747"400 (to be delivered in 
• 1994) 
• Options: 12 Boeing 747-400s 广 . , . 工. 
and 14 Airbus A330-300s • Conversion of options to f.rm 
orders postponed: 3 Boeing 747-
• Fleet size: 45 aircraft 400s (originally due for delivery 
in 1994) 
• Options: 11 Boeing 747~400s, 11 
Boeing 777s and 14Airbus 
A330-300s 
• Other orders placed: 3 flight 
simulators for Boeing 747~400, 
Airbus A330 and Boeing 777 




7. Corporation / • Joint service with Vietnam • Joint service wi th Philippine 
Alliance with Airlines to operate Ho Chi Minh Airlines to operate Cebu 
Other Airlines City and Hanoi 
• American Airlines withdrew 
• Cooperation wi th Air Niugini to from the joint venture to Los 
operate Port Moresby terminated Angeles 
• Global Logistics System 
Worldwide Ltd. for 
Development of Freight 
Information Networks GmbH, 
wi th Lufthansa, Japan Airlines 
and Air France officially founded 
in Frankfurt 
• Global Logistics System Asia Co. 
Ltd. Set up in cooperation with 
Japan Airlines 
8. Intra-industry • Shareholders Structure • Purchased airline catering 
S - — . c 5.850. =i=;===L_ 
• CITIC Pacific 12.50% 「 。 … 。 
• Shareholders Structure 
.CTS(Ho ld ings)HK 5.01% .Swi rePac i f ic 51.857。 
l O M C 5.0r/o _ c m c p a d f i c 12.50。/。 
• Other long-term and 5.00% „ ^ ^ ,^ _, . . . 、^>/ 
institutional shareholders .〔^S (Holdings) HK 5.01 % 
•Pub l i c 21.63% , C N A C 5.01% 
• Other long-term and 5.00% 
institutional shareholders 
• Public 21.63% 
9. Organizational • Announced plans to relocate a 
Structure number of functions outside 
Changes Hong Kong _ relocation of 
Revenue Accounting 
Department to Guangzhou and 
move of computer systems to 
Sydney 
• Customer Services Automation 
Department formed 
• A 2-year project to streamline 
operations and boost 
competitiveness, Operation 
Better Shape, started 
• Peter Sutch became Chairman 
after David GIedhil l retired 
• Managerial staff began work ing 
shifts at Kai Tak check in as part 





1. New • Unveiled a new logo and livery, 
Promotion the "Brushwing' — the new 
corporate identity showed the 
airline based at the very heart of 
Asia 
2. New Services / • Marco Polo Business Class 
Services renamed Cathay Pacific Business 
Improvement Class, and a personal TV set in 
the armrest introduced 
• Shift in catering towards Asian 
Cuisines 
• In Hong Kong, dedicated first 
class and business class lounges 
introduced 
• CX Cargo Clan Elite in 1994 — a 
d u b for top customers w i th 
special d u b activities and f ly ing 
privileges 
3. Dai ly • Frequencies of services • Frequencies of services increased 
Departure extenuated 「 ， _ 
Increase / ‘ Europe, North America and 
Decrease • Bahrain and Vancouver Australia (freighter services) 




4. Route Exit / • New destinations • New destinations 
Entry 
• Colombo • Toronto 
• Cairns • Bombay (freighter services) 
• Destinations canceled • Destinations canceled 
_ Kota Kinabulu (transferred to • Bandar Seri Begawan 
Dragonair) (transferred to Dragonair in 
• Serve 42 destinations in 26 細 … 
countries and territories • Serve 42 destinations in 26 
countries and territories 
5. Frequent Flyer • Launched frequent flyer 
Program programme in conjunction wi th 
Malaysian Airlines and Singapore 
Airlines — Asian Frequent Flyer 
Programme (AFFP) 
6. Acquisit ion of • New aircraft introduced • New aircraft introduced 
New Planes ^ „ . ^ 
• 3 Boeing 747*400s • 1 Boeing 747~400 (on 
. l L o c k h e e d L 1 0 1 1 T r i s t a r operating lease) 
• Order confirmed: 6 Airbus A330- • ^ Boeing 747400F freighter 
300s and 8 A340-200s • 7 Airbus A330-300s 
• An operating lease agreement for • 2 Airbus A340-200s (on 
1 aircraft for a period of four operating lease) 
years signed 「• • . __ . , 
• Fleet size: 55 aircraft 




7. Corporation / 
Ailiance with 
Other Airlines 
8. Intra-industry • Shareholders Structure • In May, acquired 75% stake in 
5 ^ c l = = . Swire Pacific 51.85% ^ '^ Hong Kong which is now 
Acquismon being run as an independent 
_ CITIC Pacific 12.50% concern by a management team 
• CTS (Holdings) HK 5.01 % "econded from Cathay Pacific 
• C N A C 5.01% • 'n Augustsigned a 
memorandum of understanding 
• Other long-term and 5.00% with Xiamen Airport Authorities 
institutional shareholders to acquire for HK$336 mil l ion, 
.Pub l i c 91 f,:50/ shareholding in Xiamen 
zi.b"^ 丨。International Airport Group Co. 
Ltd. 
• CNAC started new training 
programme with CX on behalf of 
CAAC with middle managers 
from China Eastern and CAAC 
working with CX in various 
operations 
• Cathay Kansai Terminal Services 
Company limited started 
operations and in December, 
177o interest in this company 
sold to Northwest Airlines 
leaving a 33% shareholding 
• TAECO started operations 
• In May, 40% interest of CPCS 
sold to LSG Lufthansa GmbH 
• Acquired an additional 38% 
interest in Vogue Laundry 
Services Ltd. bringing total 
shareholding to 65% 
• Shareholders Structure 
• Swire Pacific 52.637。 
• CITIC Pacific 10.00% 
• CTS (Holdings) HK 5.01% 
‘ C N A C 5.01% 
• Public 27.350/0 
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9. Organizational • Operation Better Shape resulted • Introduced a new method of 
Structure in the re-organization of the classifying jobs and 
Changes senior management structure, compensation and benefits were 
creating a smaller executive increasingly applied accordingly 
team, merging a number of areas 
of responsibility and introducing 
a clear senior-level focus on 
route profitabil ity and the 
customer 
• The commercial area came 
under a deputy managing 
director 
• The task of ensuring future 
success came under Corporate 
Development, also led by a 
deputy managing director whose 
prime responsibility i s to 
coordinate formation of the 
company's China strategy and 
also oversees the rapidly growing 
subsidiary and associated 
company such as Dragonair 
• Customer service efforts which 
include HK and overseas airport 
come under one Director 
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1. New 
Promotion 
2. New Services / • Announced a number of service 
Services upgrade including a 
Improvement comprehensive inflight 
entertainment upgrade over two 
years — offering of every 
passenger a personal television 
monitor with videos, games and 
interactive information 
programmes 
• Language skills of inflight and 
ground staff under reviewed 
• Twice weekly non-stop services 





4. Route Exit / • New destinations • New destinations 
Entry • Stockholm (in March) • New York (in March) 
• Serve 44 destinations in 27 
countries and territories 
5. Frequent Flyer • All Nippon Airways, Delta 
Program Airlines, Diners Club joined the 
AFFP 
6. Acquisition of • New aircraft introduced • New aircraft introduced (in ” 
NewPlanes . zAirbusA330-300s ha l fo f1996) 
• 2 Airbus A340-200s (on " 2 Boeing 777-200s 
operating lease) • 3 Boeing 747-200F freighters 
• 1 Boeing 747^00 • 2 Airbus A330-300s (1 on 
_ 1 Boeing 747^00 freighter operating lease) 
• Order confirmed: 7 Boeing 777- • ^ Airbus A340-300s 
300s and a further purchase of 2 • New aircraft to be introduced (in 
Airbus A330-300 (to be 2"^ half,) 
delivered in 1996), 22 Airbus 。 „ . „ ^ 
A340-200s/A330-300s and • ^ Boemg 777-200s 
Boeing 777s (to be delivered • 2 Airbus A330-300s 
during 1996-1999) 
• 3 Airbus A340-300s 




7. Corporation / • Code sharing service with British • Code sharing service wi th Ansett 
Alliance with Midland Airways to Glasgow New Zealand to Christchurch 
Other Airlines commenced in March 1996 
8. Intra-industry • Acquired a 10% stake in Hong • TAECO aircraft maintenance 
Merger and Kong air cargo terminals Ltd. facilities, at Gaoqi Airport in 
Acquisition (HACTL) in which Swire pacific Xiamen in which CX holds 10% 
already hold a long term shareholding opened for business 
shareholding of 20%. in March and w i l l increasingly 
, ^ , j .丄 . . meet the airline's base 
• An agreement reached w.th jo.nt maintenance requirements at 
venture partner V,etnam A.r mes 「educed cost 
to extend the alliance from 15 to 
20 years and Cathay Pacific's 
equity in the CXA/N Catering 
Services limited be reduced from 
50% to 40 7o 
• HAECO signed a Heads of 
Agreement wi th Rolls Royce Plc. 
to form a 50/50 joint venture for 
commercial engine overhaul at 
Tseung Kwan 0 and a total of 
HKD 1400mi l l ion to be 
invested in a maintenance 
facility at Chek Lap Kok 
• Shareholders Structure 
• Swire Pacific 52.63% 
• CITIC Pacific 10.00% 
• CTS (Holdings) HK 5.01% 
• CNAC 5.017o 




9. Organizational • Opened a purpose-built 
Structure computer center near Sydney 
Changes 
• Established Aircrew Services Ltd. 
in conjunction with AHK to 
employ cockpit crew based 
outside HK for both airlines' 
freighters 
• 308 cockpit crew based outside 
HK and cabin crew basings 
overseas began on a trial basis 
• Signed a conditional 
memorandum with the Airport 
Authority to develop a 3.3 
hectare site at Chek Lap Kok as a 
new headquarter 
• A career center established and a 
job bid scheme introduced. 
• Staff from Financial Services, 
Information Management and 
Personnel Departments assigned 
to work closely wi th particular 
departments 
• Total staff of 14,644 working in 
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